The Supreme Court Gives an Endangered Act New Life: Bennett v. Spear and Its Effect on Endangered Species Act Reform by Barney, Deanne M.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 76 | Number 5 Article 18
6-1-1998
The Supreme Court Gives an Endangered Act New
Life: Bennett v. Spear and Its Effect on Endangered
Species Act Reform
Deanne M. Barney
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deanne M. Barney, The Supreme Court Gives an Endangered Act New Life: Bennett v. Spear and Its Effect on Endangered Species Act
Reform, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1889 (1998).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol76/iss5/18
NOTES
The Supreme Court Gives an Endangered Act New Life:
Bennett v. Spear and Its Effect on Endangered Species Act
Reform
Rebellious environmental author Edward Abbey once wrote:
"Original sin .. is the blind destruction for the sake of greed of this
natural paradise which lies all around us."' Unlike many who would
agree with the notion of protecting those creatures of intrinsic and
aesthetic beauty, Mr. Abbey was not only advocating that the most
eye-catching aspects of our environment warrant protection, but also
creatures both unappealing and pestilent2 While many of us may
acquiesce in protecting a disagreeable species whose habitat is
located on public land far from our homes, few of us are as tolerant
as Mr. Abbey and would not likely welcome government
condemnation of our own backyards because of a few unsightly
insects.' Yet that is exactly what the Endangered Species Act4
("ESA" or "the Act") empowers the government to do, and it is for
this reason that the Act itself is labeled endangered.5
Despite the Act's application to private property,6 courts often
1. EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE 190 (1968).
2. See id. In his vision of paradise, Mr. Abbey includes "scorpions and tarantulas
and flies, rattlesnakes and Gila monsters." Id.
3. The problem with protecting endangered species is that of the ten million species
in the world, most are insects, plants, and fungi located in backyards and irrigation
ditches. See Nature, Nurture and Property Rights, ECONOMIST, July 8,1995, at 24, 24.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-205,87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (1994)).
5. The ESA was passed with virtually no opposition 20 years ago, but it is now
"nearly as imperiled as the creatures it was designed to protect." Betsy Carpenter, Is He
Worth Saving? The Potent New Campaign to Overturn the Endangered Species Act, U.S.
NEWs & WORLD REP., July 10, 1995, at 43, 43. The Act is said to be "clearly in trouble."
David Seligman, Keeping up: Our Spirited Republicans, Insects on the March, and Other
Matters, FORTUNE, Dec. 25,1995, at 231,232.
6. The Supreme Court's holding in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), interpreted the Act's broad prohibitions against
harming an endangered species to apply to private landowners. See id. at 692, 708; see
also infra notes 154-59, 274-79 and accompanying text (discussing Sweet Home). The
application of the ESA to private property is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the
Act. See Frona M. Powell, Defining Harm Under the Endangered Species Act:
Implications of Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 131, 149 (1995) ("To many, the
most controversial aspect of the [ESA] is its power to take private property through
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differed on whether landowners and other parties could assert
economic-based interests under the ESA.7 Some courts decided that
Congress had limited the class of plaintiffs who could bring
challenges under the ESA to those falling within the zone of interests
that the statute was intended to protect! As a result, these courts
held that the plaintiffs' economic-based claims were outside the zone
of interests protected by the ESA because the plaintiffs did not have
an interest in protecting endangered species.9  Other courts
determined that the plaintiffs' economic-based claims fell within the
zone of interests protected by the Act and thus concluded that these
plaintiffs had the requisite standing to bring their challenges.10 Still
other courts refused to apply the zone of interests test to claims
under the ESA, determining that plaintiffs need to meet only
traditional Article III standing requirements." The courts'
conflicting decisions became a source of confusion for property
owners and environmentalists alike. 2
Along with the uncertainty in the courts regarding judicial access
for property interests was the increasing intensity of the cry to reform
"America's most controversial environmental law""3 so as to
incorporate economic interests in ESA determinations. 4 In spite of
extensive regulation of land use.").
7. Compare Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065-67
(9th Cir. 1994) (applying the zone of interests test to plaintiffs suit brought pursuant to
the ESA), Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585,590-92 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same),
and Humane Soe'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(same), with Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to apply the zone of interests test to plaintiffs claim under the ESA), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and Mausolf v.
Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (D. Minn. 1996) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 125 F.3d
661 (8th Cir. 1997).
8. See, e.g., Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. ICC, 35 F.3d 585,590-95 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
9. See, eg., Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining that
the plaintiffs were without standing to challenge an ESA decision because they asserted a
purely economic interest), rev'd sub nom. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs' economic-based claims fell within the zone of
interests that the ESA was intended to protect).
11. See, e.g., Defenders or Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
12. See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: The Zone of
Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763,
777 (1997) (noting that prior to Bennett the prevailing sentiment surrounding the
application of the zone of interests test was uncertainty).
13. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277,278 (1993).
14. See Betsy Carpenter, This Land Is My Land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
14, 1994, at 65, 65-69 (describing the new private property rights movement); Richard
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vocal political support for reducing the effect of the ESA on property
owners,15 proponents of the ESA have been unwilling to sacrifice
their hard work on species conservation, and prior congressional
attempts at ESA reform have proven unsuccessful without
environmentalists' support. 6 On March 19, 1997, with a stalemate
halting congressional reform efforts between environmentalists and
property-interest proponents, a unanimous Supreme Court, led by
Justice Scalia, handed down its most recent decision involving the
Endangered Species Act.
In Bennett v. Spear,7 the Supreme Court resolved the long-
standing debate regarding judicial access, holding that property
owners asserting economic interests are not subject to the zone of
interests test when determining standing under the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA.'8 In contrast, the Court determined that for
purposes of standing under the Administrative Procedures Act19
("APA"), parties asserting that they have suffered economically
because of agency action are required to meet the zone of interests
test. Thus, when asserting a claim under the APA, plaintiffs must
show that their asserted interest falls within the zone of interests
Congress contemplated when enacting the provision at issue in the
underlying statute.-0
Miniter, You Just Can't Take It Anymore: America's Property Rights Revol POL'Y REV.,
Fall 1994, at 40, 40-46 (comparing the private property rights revolt to the tax revolt that
resulted in tax cuts during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s); Robert H. Nelson,
Shoo Shovel & Shut up, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 82, 82 (stating that "growing
agreement among many insiders [is] that the [ESA] must be revised by establishing strong
positive, rather than negative, incentives... for landowners to protect endangered species
habitat"); see also Stuart Hardy, The Endangered Species Act On a Collision Course with
Human Needs, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87, 97 (1992) (asserting that for the ESA to survive
it must be restructured to include "flexibility, balance and accommodation"); Michelle K.
Walsh, Note, Achieving the Proper Balance Between the Public and Private Property
Interests: Closely Tailored Legislation As a Remedy, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 317, 317 (1995) (proposing that ESA legislation should seek to include the
interests of private property owners).
15. President Bush called the ESA a "broken" law that "must not stand." Houck,
supra note 13, at 278.
16. See T.H. Watkins, New Congress, Old Lesson, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 112,
112 (asserting that any ESA reform efforts must include environmentalists, given the re-
energized environmental movement and the futile attempts of the 104th Congress to
reform the ESA).
17. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
18. See id. at 1162-63; see also infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing
the zone of interests test).
19. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
706 (1994)).
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994); Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167-68 (determining that
petitioners' claims brought pursuant to § 7 of the ESA fall within the zone of interests
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This Note first discusses the basic structure of the ESA,
explaining briefly how a species is determined to be endangered and
how its habitat is designated as critical.2' Next, the Note explains the
threshold issue of standing, including both constitutional and
prudential limitations.' After reviewing the recent Supreme Court
decision in Bennett v. Spear, highlighting the relevant facts and
arguments,2 the Note then examines the statutory background of the
ESA, including the policies and theories that were the impetus for its
enactment and subsequent amendment.24 The Note next discusses
how Bennett comports with modem endangered species litigation and
how the Bennett decision will affect Congress's legislative actions in
reforming the ESA.25 This Note thereafter reviews the legal
background leading up to the Bennett decision, focusing particularly
on the history of prudential standing and the zone of interests test in
the context of citizen suits brought under the ESA, and discusses how
the Court's decision clarifies ESA civil-suit standing requirements. 26
Finally, the Note assesses how the Bennett decision will impact
litigation involving the application of the National Environmental
Policy Act27 ("NEPA") to the ESA.
A basic summary of the ESA 29 and standing30 is helpful in
understanding the significance of the Bennett decision in the
jurisprudential landscape. Hailed as an "environmental jewel '31 and
that Congress intended to protect in enacting § 7). The APA provides a right of review
"where there is no other adequate remedy in court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. The plaintiff,
however, must also demonstrate that she suffered a "legal 'wrong" or was "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Id. at
§ 702 (emphasis added).
21. See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 62-142 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 143-87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 188-235 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 236-88 and accompanying text.
27. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4321-4370 (West Supp. 1995)).
28. See infra notes 289-321 and accompanying text.
29. For an extensive overview of the ESA, see generally DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
(1989), and James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A
Closer Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499 (1991).
30. For an account of the evolution of the standing doctrine, see GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94-106 (2d ed. 1991), William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-28 (1988), and Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163,
168-97 (1992).
31. Elizabeth A. Foley, The Tarnishing of an Environmental Jewel. The Endangered
1892 [Vol. 76
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the most powerful environmental statute in existence today,32 the
ESA is triggered by the listing of a species as "endangered" or
"threatened. '3 3 The task of listing terrestrial species is granted to the
Secretary of the Interior through the Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS"), while the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), is responsible for
listing all marine species.' Listing is carried out using only "the best
scientific and commercial data available." 35 After listing a species,
the Act requires the Secretary to designate as "critical habitat" land
or water areas that are essential to the listed species' existence. The
critical habitat determination is based on "the best scientific data
available" as well as the "economic impact, and any other relevant
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat."37  In
addition to designating critical habitat, the Secretary must develop
and implement recovery plans for the continued survival of the
Species Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 253,253 (1992).
32. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (calling the ESA
"the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation"); Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act: No Surprises and the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REv.
371, 371 (1996) (dubbing the ESA the "'pitbull of all environmental [legislation]'"
(alteration in original) (quoting AMC Fears Legislative "Pitbull" Industry Anxious for
ESA Rewrite, 7 MINE REG. REP. 412, 412 (1994))); Shelli Lyn lovino, Casebrief, Habitat
Modification and ESA Takings Under Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon, 7 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 481, 481 (1996) (stating that the ESA is
"indisputably the most powerful and sweeping wildlife legislation to date").
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994). A species is considered "endangered" if it is "in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(6)
(excluding, however, certain insect species determined by the Secretary to be pests). A
species is considered "threatened" if it is "likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(20).
For the most part, the ESA does not distinguish between endangered and threatened
species; however, the prohibitions are somewhat more lenient regarding private activities
affecting a species that is merely threatened. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305,
312 (1997).
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). A species becomes a candidate for listing either by
initiation of the Secretary, by petition of an interested party such as an environmental
organization, or by an emergency listing. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.10, 424.14, 424.20 (1996).
Criteria used in deciding whether a species should be listed include: (1) the present state
of the species' habitat and the potential for its destruction or modification; (2) the overuse
of the species' habitat; (3) disease and predation; (4) the effectiveness of current
regulation on the species' survival; and (5) any other natural or man-made factors
affecting the species' continued existence. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
36. See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
37. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
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species.38
Once a species is listed, section 9 of the ESA forbids the taking,
possession, or sale of that species by any person.39 Federal agencies
also must comply with section 7's consultation requirements to
ensure that their actions do not "jeopardize the continued existence
of any [listed] species" or adversely affect a species' critical habitat.0
To fulfill section 7, when an agency proposes a project, it must
consult with the FWS to see if any listed species are in the area where
the proposed project will take place.4' If a listed species is found, the
agency must prepare a biological assessment to determine if the listed
species will be affected by the project.42 If the biological assessment
determines that the species will be affected, formal consultation
between the agency and the FWS must take place, and the FWS will
then prepare a biological opinion using the "best scientific and
commercial data available." 43 The biological opinion will contain a
"jeopardy" or "no jeopardy" determination for the listed species, but
if the biological opinion concludes that the project is likely to
jeopardize the species, the opinion must provide "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" that would allow the project to proceed. 44
The ESA also contains a citizen-suit enforcement provision
allowing aggrieved individuals to file civil suits. 45 The citizen-suit
provision of the ESA allows "any person" to enjoin an alleged
violation of the Act, to compel the Secretary of the Interior to assert
the prohibitions on takings, or to compel the Secretary to perform a
duty that is not discretionary under section 4 of the ESA.46
Individuals bringing citizen suits must meet the requirements of
38. See id. § 1533(0(1). A recovery plan must be implemented "unless [the
Secretary] finds that such a plan will not promote conservation of the species." Id.
39. See id. § 1538(a)(1). Section 9's prohibition applies to both federal and
nonfederal (i.e., private and state) actions. See id.
40. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
41. See id. § 1536(c)(1).
42. See id.
43. Id. § 1536(c)(1)-(2).
44. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
45. See id. § 1540(g)(1). The Clean Air Act was the first environmental statute to
contain a citizen-suit provision. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
§ 12(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1706-07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994)). For a
complete analysis of the developments leading up to the creation of the citizen-suit
component of environmental statutes, see generally Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under
Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985) (discussing the impetus for
and evolution of citizen suits in environmental statutes).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). Section 4 of the ESA contains the provisions for the
listing of endangered and threatened species. See id. § 1533.
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standing.47 The standing inquiry involves both constitutional and
prudential limitations.48 Constitutional standing refers to the Article
HI requirement that judicial review be limited to "cases" and
"controversies."49  The "irreducible constitutional minimum"
requirements of standing are met when (1) the plaintiff suffers an
"injury in fact" to a legally protected interest, (2) a "causal
connection" between the injury and the conduct complained of exists,
and (3) it is "'likely,'" not "merely 'speculative,' " that the injury
will be" 'redressed by a favorable decision.' "50
In addition to constitutional requirements for standing, courts
have imposed prudential requirements that are rooted in policy
concerns.5 1  Courts have discretion as to what prudential
considerations to use,52 unless Congress has explicitly granted
standing to the full limits of Article II. 53 Because of the courts'
broad discretionary power in this area, prudential standing
requirements have been applied inconsistently. 4  Controversy
47. See Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine:
Challenging Resource Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 223, 227 (1996) (explaining that a plaintiff must meet the requirement
of standing to sue and "show that he or she has a legally recognized interest in the
outcome of [an] action").
48. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2. For a discussion of standing and its purpose of
serving the doctrine of separation of powers, see generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
881 (1983) (explaining the importance of standing in light of the doctrine of separation of
powers). But see generally Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review
After Lujai- Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 335 (1991) (deconstructing the importance of standing in the theory of separation of
powers).
50. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,38,43 (1976)).
51. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (noting that the Court has rules limiting
the cases it may hear that are based solely on policy grounds, rather than on constitutional
considerations). Prudential concerns, like constitutional requirements of standing, also
play a role in the separation of powers. See, e.g., David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 37, 46-48 (asserting that
while prudential limitations are not imposed by Article HI, the Court imposes prudential
limitations to serve the policy of separation of powers).
52. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (determining that prudential standards do
not constitute a "limitation on judicial power"); see also Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d
1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (establishing that courts are "free to weigh [prudential]
principles").
53. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (recognizing that "Congress may grant an express right
of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules").
54. See Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test,
1983 DUKE L. 447, 448 (arguing that "[c]ourts have blindly applied the test, confused
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concerning their application has centered largely on whether
Congress intended to override the prudential limitations in defining
who may sue under the ESA's citizen-suit provision.55
The prudential standing concern in Bennett involved the zone of
interests test.5 6 The zone of interests test originated in specific
language in the APA, stating that "[a] person... aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review.5s7 Despite its origin in the APA, lower courts increasingly
have applied the zone of interests test in the context of non-APA
environmental litigation to determine whether the plaintiff's injury is
the kind Congress contemplated as worthy of protection under the
environmental statute in question."8 This application has sparked a
debate over whether the zone of interests test should apply to actions
outside the APA. 9 In Bennett v. Plenert,0 the Ninth Circuit held that
the contexts in which it applies, and distorted its method of application").
55. See Robert B. June, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and
the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761,794 (1994) (finding that "the central
issue presented in many cases is whether Congress has displaced the prudential concerns
with its grant of standing").
56. For a discussion of the history of prudential standing and the zone of interests
test, see infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive review of the
zone of interests test of prudential standing, see 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.7, at 506-26 (2d ed. 1984); Church, supra
note 54, at 449-69.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 60-61 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (citing Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987), as
authority for applying the zone of interests test to the ESA). But see Defenders of
Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply the zone of
interests test to the ESA), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
59. Compare Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations
in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 93, 146 (1996)
(arguing that "the modem court will not extend the use of the zone of interests test much
beyond ... the [APA]"), with Sarah A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation: The Supreme Court Tightens the Reins on Standing for Environmental
Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 443, 460-63 (1991) (characterizing the zone of interests test
as having general prudential applicability). See generally Jeffrey W. Ring & Andrew F.
Behrend, Using Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt to
Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 345, 351 (1993)
(arguing that absent congressional limits written into the law, citizen suits extend to the
full limits of Article III); Martha Colhoun & Timothy S. Hamill, Comment,
Environmental Standing in the Ninth Circuit: Wading Through the Quagmire, 15 PUB.
LAND L. REv. 249, 270 (1994) (asserting that "confused courts [have applied] prudential
restrictions in situations of both APA and non-APA review").
60. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154
(1997). On July 4, 1994, Marvin Plenert was replaced by Michael Spear as Regional
Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. See Brief for Respondents at 1
n.1, Bennett (No. 95-813).
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the zone of interests test did apply to citizen-suit claims brought
under the ESA.61 This decision set the stage for the Supreme Court's
reversal in Bennett v. Spear.
In 1992, in accordance with the consultation provisions of section
7 of the ESA,62 the Bureau of Reclamation63 (the "Bureau") notified
the FWS that the Bureau's continuing Klamath Irrigation Project'
might affect the Lost River Suckerfish and the Shortnose Suckerfish,
both listed as endangered in 1988.65 As a result of the consultation,
the FWS issued a biological opinion66 on the project which concluded
that the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize the fish.67 Under
the ESA, however, a project may continue if "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" are provided that avoid putting a species in
jeopardy.6 The biological opinion of the FWS recommended several
alternatives, including a proposal to maintain minimum water levels
61. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919.
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Section 7 of the ESA mandates that each
federal agency ensure that any action it authorizes, funds, or carries out "is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species." Id.
63. The Reclamation Act, passed by Congress in 1902 to aid small farmers in the arid
western United States, led to the formation of the Bureau, which was to sell unused
federal lands to raise funds to "reclaim" or irrigate small family plots to encourage land
development. See Reclamation Act, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (1994)). The Secretary of the Interior initially created the
Reclamation Service to administer the Reclamation Act; however, the service was later
renamed the "Bureau of Reclamation." See Gregory Horwood, Forfeiture of Rights to
Federal Reclamation Project Waters: A Threat to the Bureau of Reclamation, 29 IDAHO L.
REV. 153, 154 n.4 (1992-93). The Secretary of the Interior is given general authority to do
what is necessary to carry out the Reclamation Act. See 43 U.S.C. § 373.
64. The Klamath Project is "one of the oldest federal reclamation schemes
[consisting] of a series of lakes, rivers, dams and irrigation canals in Northern California
and Southern Oregon." Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. The project was undertaken by the
Secretary of the Interior in 1905 and is administered by the Bureau of Reclamation. See
id.
65. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Endangered Statuses for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg.
27,130 (1988).
66. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing the steps an agency must
follow prior to issuance of a biological opinion).
67. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159 (" ' "[L]ong term operation of the Klamath Project
was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Lost River and shortnose
suckers."' " (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 3, Bennett (No. 95-813)
(quoting Biological Opinion of the Fish and Wildlife Service))).
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1994). In addition to "reasonable and prudent
alternatives," the biological opinion also must contain an "Incidental Take Permit," which
enables the agency to avoid the "take" prohibitions of the ESA in operating its project
provided that the taking is done in compliance with the terms and conditions of the
alternatives set forth in the biological opinion. See id. § 1536(o)(2); infra notes 151-59
(discussing the definition of "take" under the ESA).
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on Upper Klamath Lake and on Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs.6 9
The Bureau decided that it would continue to operate the Klamath
Project but would protect the suckerfish by using this alternative to
maintain minimum water levels.70
Subsequently, two Oregon irrigation districts that received water
from the Klamath Project and two ranchers within those districts
filed suit against the director and regional director of the FWS and
the Secretary of the Interior.7' The petitioners claimed competing
"'recreational, aesthetic and commercial' "interests in the water that
the FWS biological opinion had determined was necessary to
preserve the endangered fish.72 First, petitioners alleged that the
FWS's determination violated section 7 of the ESA because there
was "'no scientifically or commercially available evidence'
supporting the FWS's conclusion that without minimum water levels
the Bureau's Klamath Project would cause a decline in the
endangered sucker population.73 In support of this argument, the
petitioners noted that the Bureau's procedures for storing and
releasing water from the reservoirs were consistently maintained and
followed throughout the twentieth century. 74 The second claim also
alleged a violation of section 7 of the ESA, averring that there was
"'no commercially or scientifically available evidence'" indicating
that minimum water levels would have a beneficial effect on the
suckerfish population.' Petitioners' third claim asserted that a
minimum water level requirement was equivalent to a determination
69. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. Petitioners received water from Clear Lake and
Gerber reservoirs. See id.
70. See id. Theoretically, the Bureau may ignore the alternatives set forth in the
biological opinion, but if it does not follow those alternatives, the Bureau is ineligible for
an Incidental Take Permit. See id. at 1165. Without an Incidental Take Permit, the
Bureau exposes itself to the ESA's civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, criminal
penalties of up to $50,000, and imprisonment for one year for "any person" who
knowingly takes an endangered or threatened species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b).
71. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. The Bureau of Reclamation was not included in
those named as defendants. See id
72. Id. at 1160 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 34, Bennett (No. 95-
813)). Specifically, the petitioners sought to challenge the reduction in their water
supplies, the threats to their crops, and the subsequent devaluation of their land. See Oral
Argument for Petitioners (Nov. 13,1996), Bennett (No. 93-813), available in WESTLAW,
1996 WL 668337, at *3.
73. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 37,
Bennett (No. 95-813)).
74. See id. (citing Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 36, Bennett (No. 95-813)).
75. Id. at 1160 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 39, Bennett (No. 95-
813)). Section 7 of the ESA requires that the FWS use the "best scientific and
commercial data available" in determining the impact of an agency's action on a listed
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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of critical habitat for the fish and thus violated section 4 of the ESA
because it failed to take into consideration the economic impacts
associated with such a designation.7 6 Each of the claims also stated
that the relevant action violated the APA's prohibition against
agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."'
The district court dismissed the petitioners' claims for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that the petitioners lacked standing because
their "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests ... [did] not
fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by ESA."78
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court,
holding that the zone of interests test for standing applies to persons
who are entitled to judicial review not only under the APA,79 but also
under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA.80  Moreover, the court
concluded that plaintiffs fall within the zone of interests for standing
only when they allege an interest in the preservation of the
endangered species.8'
The Ninth Circuit reached its decision by first noting that the
issue was not whether constitutional standing had been met by the
plaintiffs, but whether the plaintiffs' action was allowed under the
doctrine of prudential standing.'m Relying on precedent in which the
zone of interests test was applied to claims brought under the ESA,
the Ninth Circuit determined that the zone of interests test was
applicable.83 The court identified species preservation as the ESA's
76. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. Section 4 requires the Secretary to designate
critical habitats for listed species using the "best scientific data available and after taking
into account the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying... critical
habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). Petitioners also raised a fourth claim: that the
implicit designation of critical habitat violated NEPA because it was not preceded by the
preparation of an environmental assessment. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160 n.1. The
claim, however, was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit and was not challenged on appeal to
the Supreme Court. See id; see also infra notes 289-321 and accompanying text
(discussing the implications of applying NEPA to environmental determinations).
78. Bennett v. Plenert, No. 93-6076-HO, 1993 WL 669429, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 18,
1993), affd, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154
(1997).
79. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 701-706
(1994)).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf .... "); Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
81. See Bennett, 63 F.3d at 919, 921-22.
8Z See idL at 917.
83. See &L at 918 (citing Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058,
1065 (9th Cir. 1994); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1581 & n.8 (9th
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overall objective and noted that the congressional intent behind the
Act's enactment was to halt species extinction " 'whatever the
cost.' "84 The court concluded that because the plaintiffs sought only
economic and recreational benefits from the water, their interests
were only "'marginally related'" to the purposes of the ESA and
thus they lacked standing.85
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners' claims
presented two issues. The first issue was whether the prudential
standing zone of interests test applied to claims brought under the
citizen-suit provision of the ESA, given the language of the citizen-
suit provision that "any person" may file suit, which could be
interpreted as negating all prudential standing limitations.86 If the
prudential standing test applied, the second issue was whether the
petitioners were within the requisite zone of interests, given that the
petitioners' interests were primarily economic and that the
petitioners were not concerned with the preservation of the
endangered suckerfish or their habitatY
The Supreme Court began its analysis by turning first to the
claims under the ESA and the question of whether the prudential
standing zone of interests test should apply to a citizen suit brought
pursuant to section 11(g)8 8 of the ESA.89 The Court reviewed its
Cir. 1993)).
84. Id. at 919-20 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184 (1978)).
85. Id. at 921 (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Lynette McCloud, A Hot
Debate: Application of the Zone of Interests Test to the Endangered Species Act, 4 Mo.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 38, 38-40 (1996), Robert W. Henry, Note, Bennett v. Plenert, or
Who Loves the Suckers? A Question of Standing Under the Endangered Species Act, 18
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 227,230-40 (1997), Sheldon K. Rennie, Note, Bennett
v. Plenert: Using the Zone-of-Interests Test to Limit Standing Under the Endangered
Species Act, 7 VILL. ENVTL. J. 375, 392-99 (1996), and Alyssa Wardrup, Note, Bennett
v. Plenert. The Ninth Circuit's Application of the Zone of Interests Test to Citizen Suits
Under the Endangered Species Act, 48 MERCER L. REv. 917, 923-29 (1997).
86. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160.
87. See id. The Court did not address directly in Bennett whether the zone of
interests test will apply outside of the APA. However, after Bennett it is clear that
statutory language such as "any person may file suit" will be adequate to negate the zone
of interests prudential standing requirement completely. See Buzbee, supra note 12, at
776 (stating that according to the Bennett Court, Article III and zone of interests standing
are "coextensive"). Despite the uncertainty of the application of the zone of interests test
outside of the APA, the test remains a requirement for filing a challenge against agency
action under the APA. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167. But when the claim is brought
pursuant to section 7 of the ESA, a plaintiff asserting solely economic interests will fall
within the zone of interests protected by the statute. See id. at 1168.
88. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA, section 11(g), provides:
[A]ny person may commence a civil suit ... (A) to enjoin any person, including
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ...
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earlier decisions on standing and explained that the concept of
standing involves both constitutional and prudential limitations."
The Court emphasized that there is an "irreducible constitutional
minimum"91 of standing under the Case and Controversy Clause of
Article III,92 whereby the plaintiff must show: (1) that he has
suffered "injury in fact"; (2) that there is a "causal connection"
between the injury and the disputed conduct such that the injury is
"fairly traceable" to the actions of the defendant; and (3) that the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. The Bennett
Court further noted that in addition to this constitutional standing
requirement, there are "'judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction' "I' that are " 'founded in concern
about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.' "I Unlike constitutional standing requirements,
the Court explained that a number of prudential standing
requirements can be enhanced or reduced by Congress. 96 The Court
specified that the prudential requirement of particular concern in
Bennett was that the plaintiffs' grievance fall within the zone of
interests protected by the provision of the statute at issue in the suit.97
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued
under the authority thereof; or ... (C) against the Secretary where there is
alleged failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under [section 4 of the
ESA] which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
89. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160-61. The Court began with the ESA rather than the
APA because the former would enable petitioners to recover their litigation costs, and
because the APA authorizes review only when no other adequate remedy is available.
See id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)).
90. See id. at 1161 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975)).
91. The Supreme Court emphasized the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of
Article III standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992).
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution states:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; .- . to Controversies between two or more
States;... between a State and Citizens of another State; ... between citizens of
different States; ....
Id.
93. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61;
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464,471-72 (1982)).
94. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984)).
95. Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498).
96. See id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
97. See id. Courts look to the statute and legislative history to determine whom
Congress intended to protect in enacting the statute. See Church, supra note 54, at 455-66
(citing Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), as an ideal
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With this background established, the Court compared the
language of the ESA citizen-suit provision with statutes that were
more explicit and restrictive in describing the class of people who
could bring suit.98  Because Congress can overcome prudential
standing requirements using statutory language, the Court concluded
that the ESA's civil-suit provision was phrased broadly enough to
reflect Congress's intention to negate any prudential standing
requirements.9 9 The Court emphasized two factors in deciding that
the term "any person" within the citizen-suit provision of the ESA
was meant to bypass prudential limitations.' First, the Court
concluded that the overall subject matter of the ESA was the
environment, in which it is customary to think that all persons have
an interest.10 1 Second, the Court determined that the purpose of the
citizen-suit provision was to encourage enforcement of the Act by
"private attorneys general,"'" given the lack of the usual amount-in-
controversy and diversity-of-citizenship jurisdictional requirements,
the potential for recovering litigation fees, and the government's
right to refuse to pursue an action initially and intervene later.103
The Bennett Court likened Congress's decision to grant standing
to the full limits of Article III to the Court's decision in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,1 4 a case involving the Civil Rights
example of the statutory and legislative analysis courts should use). Parties within the
zone of interests are the only ones with standing under this prudential requirement. See
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,882-83 (1990).
98. For example, the Court examined the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505,
86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994)), and the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 520, 91 Stat. 467, 503-
04 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994)), which permit a claim by
any person having an adverse interest. The Court also reviewed similar provisions in the
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 12, 88 Stat.
246,264 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 797(b) (1994)), which authorizes any
person suffering a legal wrong to file suit, and the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-320, § 114, 94 Stat. 974, 990 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9124(a) (1994)), which restricts judicial review to any person asserting a valid legal
interest that is or will be adversely affected only when the action gives rise to a case or
controversy. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
99. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162-63; see also supra note 88 (quoting the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA).
100. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
101. See id.
102. "Private attorneys general" is a term often used to refer to citizens acting as
plaintiffs to enforce statutory or administrative requirements. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727,737-38 (1972).
103. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
104. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Act of 1968.15 At issue in Trafficante was a provision authorizing
"'[a]ny person ... claim[ing] ... injur[y] by a discriminatory housing
practice' " to sue under the Act."6 In Trafficante, the Court stated
that the "any person" language in the Civil Rights Act provision
reflected congressional intent to expand standing to the limits of
Article I1I.107 Given the similarly broad statutory language of the
ESA provision at issue, the Bennett Court held that Congress had
intended to include economic interests in its grant of the right to file
suit pursuant to the ESA citizen-suit provision and that standing is
not restricted under the ESA to those asserting exclusively
environmental concerns. 0 8
The ranchers' and irrigation districts' economic interests were
sufficient under the statutory provisions of the ESA to confer
standing to bring a citizen suit.109 However, even if the statute
conveyed standing, the petitioners still were required to show that
they met the constitutional requirements for standing. The
government respondents had made no attempt to defend the Ninth
Circuit's holding that the petitioners did not have the requisite
standing under the ESA citizen-suit provision. Instead, the
respondents offered three alternative grounds for affirming the Ninth
Circuit decision."'
First, the government contended that the petitioners failed to
satisfy the constitutional standing requirements embodied in the case
or controversy provision of Article III."' The government asserted
105. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1994)).
106. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163 (first alteration in original) (quoting Civil Rights Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810, 82 Stat. at 85 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3610(a))).
107. See id- at 1162-63 (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210-11).
108. See id. at 1162. The Court stated that while interpreting the ESA citizen-suit
provision to extend up to the limits of Article I may allow persons to assert over-
enforcement, as well as under-enforcement, of the Act, "the citizen-suit provision does
favor the environmentalists in that it covers all private violations of the Act but not all
failures of the Secretary to meet his administrative responsibilities." Id. at 1163; see also
infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (explaining that a challenge may be brought
against the Secretary only for failure to perform a non-discretionary duty).
109. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163 (finding that the Ninth Circuit "erred in concluding
that petitioners lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test").
110. See id. at 1164-67. Because the district court and the Ninth Circuit viewed the
zone of interests ground as dispositive, these alternative grounds were not reached. The
Court, perhaps in order to clarify its current view on standing, chose to address these
alternative grounds as well, given "[a] respondent['s] ... entitle[ment] to ... judgment on
any ground supported by the record." Id. at 1163 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367,379 n.5 (1996); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 500 (1985)).
111. See id. The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of Article III standing requires
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that the petitioners had not shown "injury in fact" because the
petitioners claimed only a reduction in the overall amount of water
available, and did not provide an adequate evidentiary basis that they
would actually receive less water." 2 The Court disagreed, concluding
that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the reduced amount of water
they would receive were sufficient at this stage of the case' to justify
a finding of "injury in fact." 114
As part of their first argument, the government also asserted
that the injury lacked a causal connection to the conduct complained
of and was not " 'fairly traceable'" to the actions of the defendants
nor " 'redressable' " by a favorable decision because the harm came
not from the FWS biological opinion but from a decision that had not
yet been made as to the amount of water the petitioners would be
allocated." 5 The Court also ruled against the government on this
issue, pointing out that the government itself acknowledged that
while the FWS's biological opinion theoretically may serve only an
" 'advisory function,' " in reality, the opinion has a coercive impact
on the agency's decision to adopt the proposed alternatives. 6 The
Court stated that the FWS also was aware of the finality of its
biological opinions." 7 Because of the compelling practical effect of
the biological opinion and the modest burden at this particular stage
an injury in fact, causality, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555,560-61 (1992).
112. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163.
113. The Court noted that "'[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we
"presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim."' " Id. at 1164 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,889 (1990))).
114. See id.
115. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 22, Bennett (No. 95-813)).
116. Id. (quoting Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, As
Amended; Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,928 (1986) [hereinafter Interagency
Cooperation]). The government respondents acknowledged that a reviewing court gives
considerable deference to the FWS's views, and any agency that chooses to disregard the
alternatives proposed in the biological opinion must include reasons for disagreeing with
the biological opinion in its administrative record. See Brief for Respondents at 20-21,
Bennett (No. 95-813) (citing Interagency Cooperation, supra, 51 Fed. Reg. at 19,956). The
coercive effect of the biological opinion also arises from the fact that by failing to follow
the biological opinion's proposed alternatives, the Bureau may be subject to the civil and
criminal penalties of the ESA. Penalties can include fines of $25,000 to $50,000 per
violation and up to a year of imprisonment. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165; see also supra
note 70 (explaining that without an Incidental Take Permit, the Bureau may expose itself
to civil and criminal penalties).
117. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165 (noting that "[t]he Service itself is, to put it mildly,
keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect of its biological opinions").
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in the case, the Court determined that the plaintiffs had adequately
alleged the elements of causality and redressability."8
The government's second assertion was that the petitioners'
claims were not reviewable under the ESA citizen-suit provision
because the statute provides only for suits alleging a violation of the
Act or suits against the Secretary for failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under section 4 of the Act.'19 The Court
agreed that the ranchers' claims brought pursuant to section 7120 of
the ESA clearly were not reviewable under subsection (C) of the
ESA citizen-suit provision because that provision allows for civil suits
against the Secretary only for alleged failure to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under section 4 of the ESA.'2 The Court
concluded, however, that the ranchers' section 4 claim'l did fall
under the purview of subsection (C) of the citizen-suit provision and
was subject to judicial review because the biological opinion
contained an implicit critical habitat designation without assessing, as
required by section 4, the economic impact of that designation."2
After concluding that the petitioners' section 7 claims were not
reviewable under subsection (C) of the citizen-suit provision, the
Court continued to analyze the strength of the government's second
118. See id. at 1164 (stating that the government "wrongly equates injury 'fairly
traceable' to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's actions are the very
last step in the chain of causation").
119. See id. at 1165; see also supra note 88 (quoting the ESA's citizen-suit provision).
120. Petitioners alleged that the FWS's determination that the Klamath Project would
result in jeopardy to the endangered suckerfish and the Bureau's consequential
imposition of minimum water levels violated section 7 of the ESA, which requires that
each agency "use the best scientific and commercial data available" in making these
determinations. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994); see Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160.
121. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C). The Court stated that subsection (C) is "clear and
unambiguous" in dictating that it covers only violations of section 4 of the ESA. See
Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165. Petitioners' first and second claims, which asserted that the
Secretary violated section 7, clearly were not reviewable under this provision. See id.
122. Petitioners alleged that imposing minimum water levels on the reservoirs was
equivalent to a determination of critical habitat for the suckerfish, which violated section
4's mandate that the Secretary take into consideration economic and other relevant
factors when making such a determination. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); Bennett, 117 S. Ct.
at 1160.
123. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1166 ("[T]he fact that the Secretary's ultimate decision
is reviewable only for abuse of discretion does not alter the categorical requirement that
... he 'tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact,' and
use 'the best scientific data available.' " (quoting 16 U.S.C: § 1533 (b)(2))). Justice Scalia,
writing for a unanimous Court, expressed his disapproval of the lower courts' decisions
regarding this issue: "It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the
substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the required
procedures of decisionmaking." Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95
(1943)).
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assertion by addressing whether the same claims were reviewable
under subsection (A), which permits private parties to bring
injunction actions against alleged violators of ESA regulations. 4
Analyzing the section 7 claims under subsection (A), the Court
refused to read the "in violation of" provision'21 as an alternative
mechanism for obtaining judicial review of the Secretary's
performance under the Act.'2 The Court also noted that the term
"violation" is used elsewhere in contexts that do not refer to a failure
of the Secretary or other officer to perform their administrative
duties under the Act.u7 Thus, the Court determined that the
reference to "violations" of the ESA in subsection (A) does not
include the Secretary's "maladministration of the Act."2
Because the statutory provisions of the ESA did not give the
petitioners standing to bring their section 7 claims,129 the Court
returned to the prudential zone of interests standing test to
determine whether the plaintiffs could challenge the action under the
APA."' In applying the "zone of interests" test, whether a plaintiff's
interest is protected by the statute is determined by looking at the
particular provision upon which the plaintiff relies, not the overall
purpose of the Act.13 ' The Court stated that the obvious purpose of
124. See id.
125. See supra note 88 (quoting the relevant portion of 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)).
126. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1166. The Court explained that in its view, subsection
(A) was a "means by which private parties may ... enforce the substantive provisions of
the ESA against regulated parties-both private entities and Government agencies-but
is not an alternative avenue for judicial review of the Secretary's implementation of the
statute." Id.
127. See id. As an example, the Court cited § 1540(a), which enables the Secretary to
impose civil penalties on " '[a]ny person who knowingly violates ... any provision of [the
ESA].'" Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 1540(a) (1994)).
128. Id. at 1167.
129. See supra note 120 (summarizing the petitioners' section 7 claims).
130. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160. The APA allows courts to prohibit "agency action
that is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.'" Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)). Petitioners can file suit to challenge
administrative action under the APA, which provides for judicial review of final agency
actions when "there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. However,
the APA itself does not confer standing. Given that the petitioners' section 7-based
claims were not within the statutory citizen-suit provisions of the ESA that conferred
standing, there was no congressional conferral of standing. If Congress has not
augmented standing through express statutory language, the prudential "zone of interest"
standing requirements apply and petitioners must show they are within the zone of
interests to be protected by the provision of the ESA at issue. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 91 (1984); see also supra note 87 (discussing the
application of the zone of interests test under both the ESA and the APA).




the requirement that each agency use the "best scientific and
commercial data available"'32 is to "ensure that the ESA not be
implemented haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise.' 1 33
The Court determined that the provision's requirement was essential
to avoid the economic disorder that may result from agency officials
unwittingly pursuing environmental objectives with complete
disregard for the commercial consequences." 4 Thus, the Court
concluded that the petitioners' claim that they had suffered from an
"uneconomic (because erroneous) jeopardy determination"
adequately met the zone of interests test for standing under section 7
of the ESA.135
The Court then addressed the government's third and final
contention that petitioners could not obtain judicial review under the
APA because a biological opinion is not "final agency action"
reviewable under the APA.'36 The Court explained that two
conditions must be met for agency action to be "final." 37 First, the
action must be the culmination of the agency's decisionmaking
process. 38 Second, the action must be one that determines rights or
obligations, or one that creates legal consequences. 39 It was
uncontested that the first element of finality had been met, and the
Court decided that the second requirement also was fulfilled.
4°
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (1994).
133. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1168.
134. See id.
135. Id. The Court determined that the zone of interests test was required for the
action under the APA, but was not required for the citizen-suit provision. See Bennett,
117 S. Ct. at 1163, 1167; see also supra note 87 (explaining the effect of Bennett on the
zone of interests test in civil suits under the ESA and APA). At least one commentator
believes that in addition to abolishing the zone of interests requirement in ESA cases, the
Bennett decision "may also foreshadow the complete demise of the test." Brennan Cain,
Note, Bennett v. Spear: Did Congress Intend for the Endangered Species Act's Citizen-
Suit Provision to Be One Size Fits All?, 20 ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 2, 16 (1997).
Complete dissolution of the zone of interests test would likely have pleased Justice
Brennan, who characterized the test as confusing and constitutionally unnecessary. See
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,168-69 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1168-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). The APA
provides for review of final agency action when no other adequate remedy exists. See 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
137. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1168.
138. See id. (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948)). The Court stated that the agency action "must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature." IdL
139. See id. (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62,71 (1970)).
140. See id. at 1168-69 (noting that "the Biological Opinion and accompanying
Incidental Take Statement [would] alter the legal regime to which the action agency is
subject" and would have "direct and appreciable legal consequences"). The Court
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Hence, the Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had
erred in affirming the district court's dismissal of petitioners' claims141
and remanded the case for review of petitioners' section 4 claim
under the ESA citizen-suit provision and the petitioners' remaining
section 7 claims under the APA. 42
The policies and theories that led to the enactment and
subsequent amendment of the ESA significantly influenced the
outcome in Bennett and therefore warrant discussion. Passed with
overwhelming congressional support in 1973,143 the ESA represented
an effort to conserve plants and animals that were threatened with
extinction.1" The ESA, informally called "Mother Nature's 911, '"145
assessed the finality of the Biological Opinion by comparing the effect of the Opinion to
other events the Court had previously found too tentative to constitute final agency
action. See id. at 1168 (citing Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994) (holding that the
submission of base closure recommendations to the President by the Secretary of Defense
and corresponding committee did not constitute final agency action because the
recommendations had to be approved by the President, who also had complete discretion
to reject them); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (explaining that the
Secretary of Commerce's presentation of a decennial census report to the President did
not constitute final agency action because the preliminary nature of the census had no
direct legal consequences)).
141. The Court noted that "petitioners' complaint allege[d] facts sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article III standing, and none of their ESA claims [were] precluded by
the zone-of-interests test." Id. at 1169.
142. See id.
143. The Senate passed the ESA unanimously, see 119 CONG. REC. 25,692 (1973), and
the House of Representatives passed the Act with only four dissenting votes, see id. at
42,915. Two previous endangered species laws had proven ineffective prior to the
enactment of the ESA in 1973. See MARTY BERGOFFEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
REAUTHORIZATION: A BIOCENTRIC APPROACH 31-34 (Elissa C. Lichtenstein ed., 1995)
(tracing the history leading up to the creation of the ESA in 1973). The two previous acts
were the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 5, 83 Stat.
275, 278, and the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80
Stat. 926.
144. See Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2, 87 Stat. 884, 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)) (providing congressional findings for enacting the ESA,
including that various fish, wildlife, and plants have become extinct as a result of
economic growth and development); H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 4-5 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455 (stating that Congress's impetus for the Act was concern
about rapid deterioration of environmental resources and an increasing number of species
threatened with extinction). A species is considered "endangered" if it "is in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the
Class Insecta determined ... to constitute a pest." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). A species is
considered "threatened" if it "is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(20).
145. Mollie Beattie, Former Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, was a
strong proponent of the ESA, and often referred to the Act as an "early warning system,"
a "weather vane," or "Mother Nature's 911." See Patrick Parenteau, She Runs with
Wolves, 21 VT. L. REV. 743, 745 (1997) (paying tribute to Director Beattie, who died of
cancer on June 5, 1996).
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was intended to counteract the greatest threats facing endangered
species: environmental degradation, habitat destruction, and
collection.'46 The ESA has been credited with creating "a new era in
species conservation"'14 7 in which the goal is to "halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."'' 4
Regulation under the ESA is broad and extensive.149 The Act
has been interpreted to apply to the actions of private citizens on
private land.50 The ESA makes it unlawful for any person "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect [a
member of an endangered species], or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."'' The Secretary of the Interior has interpreted the
term "harm" as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.' '1 52
The Secretary later broadened this definition by specifying that
"harm" also includes habitat modification significant enough to
actually kill or injure wildlife by impairing behavioral patterns such
as "breeding, feeding or sheltering."'5 3 This interpretation of the
term "harm" was upheld in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon,54 the most recent Supreme Court
decision dealing with the ESA prior to Bennett. Sweet Home also
found the regulation applicable to the actions of landowners on
146. See James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 311 (1990). In addition to the
ESA's prohibitions on injuring threatened or endangered wildlife and their habitat,
section 9 of the ESA also makes it unlawful for any person to sell, deliver, receive, carry,
transport, or ship any such species, by any means, in interstate or foreign commerce. See
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(D)-(F).
147. Cathryn Campbell, Federal Protection of Endangered Species: A Policy of
Overkill?, 3 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247,263 (1983).
148. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184 (1978).
149. See Lori Hackleman Patterson, Comment, NEPA's Stronghold: A Noose for the
Endangered Species Act?, 17 CuMB. L. REV. 753, 759 (1997).
150. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (making it unlawful for "any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" to take an endangered species). Section 7 of the ESA
applies to federal agencies acting in reference to public land. See id. § 1536(a)(2)
(mandating the application of section 7 to "Interagency Cooperation" and stating that
"[e]ach federal agency" shall not take an endangered species).
151. Id. § 1532(19) (defining the term "take").
152. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997).
153. Id.; see also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 568 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "because the Secretary
was concerned that the old definition of 'harm' could be read to mean habitat
modification alone, the Secretary inserted the phrase 'actually kills or injures wildlife' to
preclude claims that only involve habitat modification without any attendant requirement
of death or injury to protected wildlife").
154. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). The Sweet Home Court held that the section 9 prohibition
on "taking" a listed species applies to significant habitat modification on non-federal land.
See id. at 708.
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private land.55 The Sweet Home decision incited criticism 156 that
restricting development on private land constitutes a taking without
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,"7
and debate continues as to whether Congress intended the ESA to
apply to development on private land.158 Additionally, ambiguity
remains regarding how close to death or injury wildlife must be
before a violation of the Act occurs.'59
155. See iL at 697-98.
156. See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon. The Law
and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUP. Cr. ECON. REv. 1, 5-26, 49-57 (1997)
(asserting that the Court upheld the Secretary's definition without an adequate
understanding of the ESA's policies and without respect for the Constitution); Beth S.
Ginsberg, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: A
Clarion Call for Property Rights Advocates, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,478, 10,484 (1995)
(asserting that the Sweet Home decision provided fodder for the property rights
movement); Deborah Meigs Bibbins, Note, The Goal of Imperfection: Babbitt v. Sweet
Home and the Necessity of Imperfect Property Rights, 29 CONN. L. REV. 919, 931 (1997)
(determining the Sweet Home Court's interpretation of "harm" to be partly responsible
for creating tension between property law and environmental law).
157. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONS'. amend. V; see Mark
Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered
Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 831-51 (1997) (comparing two positions on
whether the Fifth Amendment requires compensation in all regulatory takings); Ike C.
Sugg, Caught in the Act" Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and
Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. Rnv. 1, 58-66 (1993) (explaining how the ESA is
suspect under the Fifth Amendment for causing direct and indirect takings of property).
Moreover, broad application of the definition of "harm" to include habitat modification
by states may violate the Tenth Amendment. See Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of
United States v. Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321,
356-64 (1997) (examining the ESA in light of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment). The ESA also may face constitutional challenges regarding the power of
Congress to use the Commerce Clause as authority for regulating endangered species,
given the modem Court's more restrictive interpretation of interstate commerce. See
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Sentelle, 3., dissenting); J. Blanding Holman, IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez:
Can the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause
Attack?, 15 VA. ENvmj. L. 139, 177-211 (1995) (assessing the constitutionality of the
ESA and the Clean Water Act in light of a more restrictive reading of the Commerce
Clause).
158. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued in
dissent in Sweet Home that the majority had misinterpreted Congress's intent because no
reasonable interpretation of the ESA would apply strict liability penalties to people's
daily activities. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 721-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Christopher F. Tate, Note, Getting out of "Harm's" Way: Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 GEo. MASON L. REv. 101, 135-36 (1996)
(concluding that the Court in Sweet Home misinterpreted Congress's intent and asserting
that future litigants face uncertainty as to what behavior will be found to violate the
ESA).
159. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the Secretary's
regulation is limited to significant habitat modification causing actual, not merely
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Despite the severity of the ESA's prohibitions and penalties, the
statute does offer some flexibility. First, the Secretary is required to
consider economic impacts in designating critical habitat."6  The
parameters of a critical habitat proposal may be modified if the
economic costs of a designation outweigh its benefits, so long as the
alteration does not lead to the extinction of a species.' If extinction
might result, the agencies are not permitted to consider economic
costs.
16 2
The ESA also provides an exemption process for economic
interests. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,6' the Supreme Court
enjoined the construction of the nearly completed Tellico Dam
because of a three-inch endangered fish called the snail darter.' The
Snail Darter fed exclusively on snails that in turn required gravel
cleaned by a constant flow of water in order to survive.65 The Court
concluded that despite more than $103 million expended by Congress
in building the dam, the relatively small number of snail darters
should receive priority because of what the Court perceived as
congressional intent to "halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost."'66 In response to the Tennessee Valley
Authority decision, Congress amended the ESA to reduce the
statute's rigidity.67 The ESA Amendments created an "Endangered
Species Committee,"' s which is popularly referred to as the "God
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable, individual animals. See Sweet
Home, 515 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She emphasized that the application of
the definition is predicated on notions of proximate causation restricting liability within
reasonable bounds of foreseeability. See id. at 713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor also suggested that Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources,
852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II), was wrongly decided because the link between
habitat modification and actual injury was too tenuous to comport with her ideas of
proximate causation. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Palila 11, 852 F.2d at 1106, which held that a Hawaiian agency's decision to allow
feral sheep to eat seedlings that, when full grown, would have fed and sheltered
endangered palila birds was considered a "taking" in violation of the ESA).
160. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
161. See id.; see also Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines:
Economics in the Endangered Species Act, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1095, 1115-18 (1993)
(explaining how the economic analysis proceeds in designating or modifying critical
habitat).
162. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
163. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
164. See id. at 195.
165. See id. at 162.
166. IL at 184.
167. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543).
168. See id. § 7(e), 92 Stat. at 3753.
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Squad"'69 because, in essence, it plays God and makes a
determination affecting the survival of a species.170 Under the
amendments, the Committee is entitled to grant exemptions from the
ESA if: (1) the proposed action is of national or regional public
interest; (2) no feasible alternative exists; and (3) the benefits of the
action outweigh the benefits of conservation.17' The exemption
process is limited, however, in that it is unavailable to private
property owners. 72  Furthermore, exemptions are politically
controversial and extremely rare. 3
One way state and private interests can avoid the prohibitions of
section 9 of the ESA 174 is to apply for an Incidental Take Permit.75
An Incidental Take Permit is granted if the taking will be incidental
to otherwise lawful activity by the party, and if the party has devised
an appropriate conservation plan (Habitat Conservation Plan, or
"HCP") that minimizes the impact of the taking on the endangered
species and ensures the species' survival and recovery.'76 While most
property owners have applied for Incidental Take Permits on an
individual basis in conjunction with a specific project, there is a
growing trend toward the creation of regional HCPs, incorporating
169. The source of the nickname is unknown, but it is used frequently. See John Lowe
Weston, Comment, The Endangered Species Committee and the Northern Spotted Owl:
Did the "God Squad" Play God?, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 779,780 n.1 (1993).
170. For further discussion on the role of the Endangered Species Committee, see
generally Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species
Act How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 825 (1991).
171. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p) (1994).
172. See id. § 1536(g).
173. The Endangered Species Committee has granted only two exemptions. See
Tanya L. Godfrey, Note, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: A Hotly
Contested Debate, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 979, 989 (1996). One exemption allowed the
construction of the Tellico Dam despite the presence of the snail darter. See id. A second
exemption was granted in 1992 to allow logging in a habitat occupied by the northern
spotted owl in Oregon. See id.
174. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing section 9 of the ESA).
175. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 100-478,102 Stat.
2306 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994)). The Incidental Take
Permit provision was part of the 1982 Amendments to the ESA. See H.R. REP. No. 97-
835, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2870. If a development project
requires any federal involvement, section 7 would supersede section 9, thereby avoiding
section 9's restrictions. Developers prefer this option because section 7 consultations
have fixed time limits and requirements that are usually lower than those faced when
applying for a section 10 Incidental Take Permit. See Thompson, supra note 33, at 315
n.59.
176. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(1)(b)-(2)(A). An Incidental Take Permit also may be
granted "for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected




multiple property owners and sometimes multiple endangered
species.'7 7  Given that over ninety percent of threatened and
endangered species rely on state and private land for part of their
habitat, and over sixty percent rely on these segments for a majority
of their habitat,'17  HCPs may be an effective way for private
landowners to meet the ESA's demands with only limited restrictions
on the use of the land.179 Yet limiting land use, even marginally, still
leaves the residual problem of unconstitutional takings under the
Fifth Amendment.
To address the takings problem, the FWS and NMFS have
proposed administrative reforms.1 0 Proposed reforms include special
permits for landowners conducting activities that have a low effect on
an endangered species.'8' Also proposed is a "no surprises" policy to
exempt landowners with an appropriate HCP from having to pay
additional money for unforeseen circumstances that arise after an
HCP is approved, as well as a "safe harbor" provision providing
immunity from further ESA liability for landowners who improve a
species' habitat on private land.' Finally, another proposal is a
"candidate conservation agreement," making landowners eligible for
a permit for the incidental taking of a species that is not yet listed but
may be proposed for listing.' s3
177. See Thompson, supra note 33, at 318-21 (noting the increase in proposed regional
HCPs and addressing some of the unique issues involved in a regional HCP).
178. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 1 (1994).
179. As many as 400 HCPs, covering approximately 18 million acres of private and
state property, are either completed or on the way to completion. See B.J. Bergman, A
Plan to Die for: With Friends Like These, Wild Creatures Don't Need Enemies, SIERRA,
Nov. 21, 1997, at 32,34; see also George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton
Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 39, 40-42 (1996) (demonstrating the Clinton
Administration's preference for HCPs as exemplified by the Administration's increased
use of them); Donald L. Soderberg & Paul E. Larsen, Triggering Section 7: Federal Land
Sales and "Incidental Take" Permits, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 169, 177-78 (1991)
(stating that many commentators suggest that an Incidental Take Permit may be the only
way to develop private property comprising an endangered species' critical habitat). But
see John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plans for Species Recovery, 27
ENVTL. L. 755, 757-64 (1997) (criticizing the current HCP requirements for species
conservation and proposing remedies).
180. See Patrick Gallagher, Endangered Species Act Reforms Aid Landowners, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 29,1997, at B9, B10.
181. See id.
182. See id. For further discussion of the "no surprises" reform measure, see generally
Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the
Endangered Species Act, 27 ENvTL. L. 767 (1997).
183. See Gallagher, supra note 180, at B10. For further discussion of the candidate
conservation agreements, see generally Martha F. Phelps, Comment, Candidate
Conservation Agreements Under the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an
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A strict interpretation of the ESA provides for little
consideration of economic impacts because the Secretary and FWS
are given considerable discretion. Nevertheless, the agencies
sometimes consider economic consequences in administering the Act
because they often face political opposition and threats of
litigation.' 4 Ultimately, economic interests are not without power to
influence the administration of the ESA. Although the ESA initially
was applied stringently to halt development projects that had even
minimal adverse effects on endangered species, the Act has been
amended subsequently and interpreted to provide greater leverage
for property owners.18 Thus, while the Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority was willing to protect a listed species "whatever the
cost,' 8 6 the current trend is towards greater involvement of all
Administrative Experiment, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175 (1997).
184. See Lifting of the Moratorium on ESA Listings: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong. 75 (1996) (prepared statement of John G. Rogers, Acting
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) (stating that the FWS is "currently faced with
several hundred Notices of Intent to Sue, as well as 159 lawsuits against the Service on
endangered species issues"), available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 345821, at *2; Ray
Vaughan, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of
the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protection for Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569,584-
90 (1995) (highlighting attacks on the ESA by business and industry groups). The ten
amicus briefs filed by governmental and developmental interests, in addition to the
absence of any amicus briefs filed by environmental groups, confirms the immense
pressure of development interests in the Bennett litigation. See Brief for American Forest
& Paper Ass'n, American Petroleum Inst., Northwest Forest Resource Council, and
Southern Timber Purchasers Council, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for the National Ass'n
of Home Builders of the United States, the California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n, the Building
Indus. Legal Defense Found., the National Multi-Housing Council, the National
Apartment Ass'n, and the National Ass'n of Indus. and Office Properties, Bennett (No.
95-813); Brief for American Homeowners Found., American Land Rights Alliance as
Amici Curiae, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for the Washington Legal Found., U.S. Senator
Dirk Kempthorne, U.S. Representatives Bill Baker, Helen Chenoweth, Gerald B.
Solomon, and Richard W. Pombo, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for the Allied Educ.
Found., and Fairness to Land Owners Comm., Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for the State of
Texas, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for the Association of Cal. Water Agencies, the State
Water Contractors, and the Central Valley Project Water Ass'n, Bennett (No. 95-813);
Brief for the American Farm Bureau Fed'n, California Farm Bureau, Idaho Farm
Bureau, Texas Farm Bureau, and Oregon Farm Bureau, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief for
the States of California, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Utah, and West Virginia, Bennett (No. 95-813); Brief
for the Pacific Legal Found., California Cattlemen's Ass'n, National Cattleman's Beef
Ass'n, the CATL Fund, and POSSEE, Bennett (No. 95-813).
185. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478,102 Stat.
2306, 2312 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994)); Endangered Species
Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411,1427 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1994)); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
632, 92 Stat. 3751, 3767 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
186. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,154 (1978).
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parties and interests affected.187
The Bennett decision appears to comport with the trend in ESA
legislation and jurisprudence toward incorporating economic and
developmental interests in the major decisions involving endangered
species. The Sweet Home Court's decision to apply the broad
prohibitions of the ESA to private parties created a disparity in favor
of environmental interests." The result was to create greater
instability in an already weak Act, with fears among ESA proponents
that the statute would be dismembered by Congress. 8 9 By giving
landowners and developers equal footing to challenge erroneous
ESA decisions, the Bennett decision creates a more equal balance
between environmentalists and property owners.190
While species advocates assert that the ESA has been under-
regulated, private landowners argue that there has been too much
regulation.'9' Predictions prior to Bennett were that the Act would
not survive if the public outcry over private property rights
continued. 192 Opposition to the ESA grew as people lost their jobs
187. See supra notes 180-83 (explaining the development of incentives for landowners
to minimize the impact of habitat modification).
188. Justice Scalia criticized the majority opinion in Sweet Home for imposing
"unfairness to the point of financial ruin" on even the smallest property owners. Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Sweet Home, see infra notes 274-79 and
accompanying text.
189. Commentators predicted that the Sweet Home decision would lead to the ultimate
demise of the ESA. See Craig Robert Baldauf, Comment, Searching for a Place to Call
Home: Courts, Congress, and Common Killers Conspire to Drive Endangered Species into
Extinction, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 847, 849 (1995); Kerry L. Sigler, Note, Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. An Invitation to Extinguish
the Endangered Species Act, 23 N. KY. L. REv. 113, 113 (1995). Following the Sweet
Home decision, property rights groups voiced their widespread opposition to the decision
and instigated an ESA reform effort in the Republican Congress in 1995. See Norman J.
Vig & Michael E. Kraft, The New Environmental Agenda, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN THE 1990s, at 365, 371 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1996). The reform
effort did little to achieve the necessary meeting of the minds required for effective
reform. See R. Clark Morrison, The Endangered Species Act in an Era of Regulatory
Reform, 3 ENVT. L. & PRAC. 13, 13 (1995) (finding most ESA supporters to be in a
"defensive posture" regarding congressional reform of the ESA).
190. See Robert S. Nix, Comment, Bennett v. Spear: Justice Scalia Oversees the Latest
"Battle" in the "War" Between Property Rights and Environmentalism, 70 TEMP. L. REV.
745, 781 (1997) (claiming the Sweet Home decision created an inequality in favor of
environmentalists resulting in a heated property rights versus endangered species debate
in Congress, making the Bennett decision a "politically necessary outcome").
191. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species
Act-A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the
Coalmine, 27 ENVT. L. 845, 859-60 (1997) (lamenting the influential environmentalist
movement in America today).
192. See Patterson, supra note 149, at 759-60. The broad interpretation of the ESA's
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and property, not just to owls and grizzly bears with notable appeal,
but to the smallest species of insects and plants.193 Particularly
controversial incidents, in which multi-million dollar ventures were
halted because of the existence of a seemingly insignificant number
of minute species, brought the issue to the media forefront in 1997,
demanding attention.194 The Bennett decision at least gives those
parties who are affected directly an opportunity to ensure that the
Secretary has not abused his discretion in deciding that land use must
be limited.
While property owners may have difficulty meeting the abuse of
discretion threshold, 195 the potential for a legal challenge will
nonetheless compel federal agencies to use sound scientific data in
making critical habitat designations and in issuing biological
provisions to include prohibitions on takings by private citizens has created public
controversy. See id. Reform of the ESA has become a top priority among grassroots
organizations. See id. at 759 n.36.
193. See WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON THE WEST 89 (1995). Pendley notes
that the ESA implementation costs have been estimated to be several billion dollars and
asserts that "Westerners know all too well what the ESA is costing in terms of lost jobs,
lost wages, lost revenues, lost projects, and lost land uses." Id. at 97.
194. One of the most unsettling events involving the ESA in 1997 concerned the
endangered Delhi Sands flower-loving fly. To avoid prosecution under the ESA for the
taking of eight Delhi Sands flies, a California county was compelled to relocate the
construction of a hospital and set aside acreage for the preservation of the flies. See
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Additionally, the county had to fund research on the flies. See Forum: Issues Affecting
the Environment in 1997, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Apr. 1997, at 56, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Allnws File. The total cost of the relocation, the land preserve, and the
research funding was $4.5 billion. See id.
195. Judicial review of agency action requires a court to determine if the action was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). In the context of administrative law, "arbitrary and
capricious" is defined as "willful and unreasonable action without consideration or in
disregard of facts or law or without determining principle." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
105 (6th ed. 1991). Abuse of discretion is characterized by "[a] judgment or decision ...
which has no foundation in fact or law." Id. at 6. Section 706(2)(A)'s standard of review
has been interpreted to mean that the reviewing court should consider whether relevant
factors were weighed and whether there was a "clear error of judgment." See Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The Supreme Court
determined that while the reviewing court's examination of the facts should be "searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one." Id.
Given the uphill battle plaintiffs face in challenging agency action under the abuse of
discretion standard, they rarely succeed in overturning agency decisions. See Cain, supra
note 135, at 15. Aware of this outcome, many environmentalists do not expect the
Bennett decision to affect ESA decisions. See id. But see Lynwood P. Evans, Note,
Bennett v. Spear: A New Interpretation of the Citizen Suit Provision, 20 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 173, 191 (1997) (stating that while the Bennett decision alone will not lead to
environmental destruction, it will give property interests greater leverage to increase
pressure on the environment overall).
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opinions. Decisions rendered under the ESA have been criticized for
their lack of scientific support.196 The National Biological Survey
("NBS") was created in response to this problem; its principal
mission is to gather accurate information about endangered and
threatened species. 197 Yet despite the hopes of the NBS's creators,
private landowners opposed research conducted by the NBS on their
property.19 This opposition was not surprising given that, prior to
Bennett, landowners would not have the opportunity to challenge any
decisions made concerning their land. While the Bennett decision
may not affect the final outcome in an ESA determination, perhaps it
will alleviate fears among private landowners who may now challenge
these determinations concerning their land, and consequently
improve the scientific quality of the determination. 99 On the other
hand, Bennett may perpetuate the exclusion of government scientists
from private land because an incentive remains to deprive ESA
decisionmakers of the data required to make accurate scientific
decisions.20 The final outcome remains to be seen, but the prevailing
sentiment among commentators is that the outcome will improve the
196. See Beth Baker, Endangered Species Legislation, BIOSCIENCE, Dec. 1, 1997, at
731,733 (" 'The Act too often lists species without a sound scientific basis.'" (quoting the
testimony of W. Henson Moore, head of the American Forest and Paper Association,
before the Senate and Environmental Works Committee hearing on a Senate bill to
reauthorize the ESA)); see also Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity Promise:
Struggling to Save Columbia Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 111-19
(1997) (stating that there are widespread complaints that recovery efforts for endangered
salmon lack scientific justification and offering solutions); Nelson, supra note 14, at 82
(asserting that the one area of ESA reform that legislators must improve upon is science).
One commentator notes that the Forest Service imposed restrictions on boating in the
Sawtooth Recreation Area in 1996 to protect the listed Chinook Salmon, despite the
Service's admitted lack of scientific evidence that the boating would have any effect on
the fish. See Murray D. Feldman, Bennett v. Spear: Supreme Court Confirms Standing to
Challenge Excessive Government Regulation Under the Endangered Species Act, 40
ADvoc. 20,23 (1997).
197. See National Biological Survey; Establishment of Organization, 58 Fed. Reg.
63,387 (1993).
198. See Royal C. Gardner, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad:
Private Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environmental Protection,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 539, 565-66 (1997). The solution to the problem presented by this
opposition was to require NBS personnel to seek consent from the owner before entering
private property. See id. at 566.
199. See Emily E. Granzotto, Extending Standing Under the Endangered Species Act to
Include Non-Environmentally Interested Parties, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 240, 244 (1997)
(predicting that the Bennett decision will add to the scientific caliber of ESA decisions).
200. The NBS has been portrayed as a "guerrilla army that [sneaks] uninvited on to
private property in search of rare creatures in whose name to block development."
Biodivisiveness, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 1995, at 85, 85.
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science used in ESA determinations.2 °'
The popular response to the flood of problems surrounding the
ESA has been a movement among both land use proponents and
endangered species advocates towards reforming the ESA.2° When
the ESA was enacted in 1973, Congress included a sunset provision
that would require periodic reauthorization of the statute.2 3 The
statute was reauthorized accordingly during the Carter
Administration in 1978214 and during the Reagan Administration in
1982205 and 1988.206 While the statute officially expired in 1992,
201. See Feldman, supra note 196, at 22 (asserting that Bennett sends an important
signal to agencies involved in ESA determinations that they will be held accountable for
the scientific adequacy and support of these decisions); Granzotto, supra note 199, at 244
(claiming that the Bennett decision will "forcefl federal agencies to establish sound factual
data before interrupting the lives of persons affected by the policies"); Cain, supra note
135, at 15 (stating that the Bennett decision will require the FWS to make sure that their
section 7 biological opinions are "scientifically defensible").
202. The ESA has been "maligned by biodiversity conservation proponents and
opponents alike, either as not doing enough or as running ramshackle over private
property rights." J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 579 (1995). ESA proponents want to improve the statute's
protection of biodiversity and to reduce the recurring conflict between environmental and
developmental interests. See Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of
Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1-33 (1996) (addressing
the ESA's failures in addressing biological diversity and suggesting reforms); Stuart L.
Somach, What Outrages Me About the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 801, 801-13
(1994) (examining the conflicts between endangered species advocates and land use
interests, and proposing solutions); James Drozdowski, Note, Saving an Endangered Act:
The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 553, 600-02 (1995) (concluding that the ESA has failed to address biodiversity and
proposing that this failure will result in irreversible loss of diversity). Property owners
want the Act to address the issue of unconstitutional takings under the Fifth Amendment,
and they want to be more directly involved in the recovery efforts. See Bipartisan ESA
Reform Moves in Senate; Bill Features Breaks for Landowners, REAL EST.IENVTL.
LLABIrrY NEwS, Oct. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legnew, Allnws File [hereinafter
Bipartisan ESA Reform] (stating that landowners want to be more involved in the
recovery planning process of endangered species and want incentives for creating HCPs);
see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (mentioning proposed incentives to
remedy the takings problem for landowners who participate in habitat conservation
efforts).
203. See Eva Tompkins, Comment, Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act-A
Comparison of Two Bills That Seek to Reform the Endangered Species Act: Senate Bill
768 and House Bill 2275, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 121 (1997). Sunset
provisions are common in public interest statutes like the ESA. See Plater, supra note
191, at 876 n.3.
204. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
205. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat.
1411 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539).
206. See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478,102 Stat.
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Congress has continued to appropriate funds annually for
enforcement of the Act without reauthorizing the statute.2t 7 A rider
attached to a Defense Department supplemental appropriations bill
in 1995 put a one-year moratorium on funding for new listings of and
critical habitat designations for endangered species,28 but Congress
decided not to enact a similar provision in 1996, and listing has since
resumed.2 9 Listings, critical habitat designations, and proposed
recovery plans for endangered species have become significantly
backlogged.210 Agencies complain that a lack of financial resources
has affected their ability to implement the Act effectively" Because
2306 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543).
207. See Tompkins, supra note 203, at 121.
208. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the
Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-6, tit. II, ch. 4, 109 Stat. 73, 86. The FWS claimed that the urgent need for
defense appropriations was fabricated. See John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander,
Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 590
(1997). The effect of the moratorium on FWS was twofold. First, the rider kept the
agency from listing endangered species or designating critical habitats. See Jason
Coatney, The Council on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of "Effective
Enforcement" Within the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32
TULSA LJ. 823, 832-33 (1997). Second, the rider reduced the FWS budget for
implementing the ESA by $1.5 million and prohibited offsetting the loss from other
programs. See id at 833. For a discussion of the destructive effect riders may have on
environmental regulations, see generally Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative
Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 457 (1997).
209. The moratorium ended on April 26, 1996, pursuant to the Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321, 1321-159
to -160.
210. Currently, 1686 species are listed as threatened or endangered. See Division of
Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Box Score: Listing and Recovery Plans
as of January 31, 1998 (visited Feb. 24, 1998) <http:lwww.fws.gov/-r9endspp/
boxscore.html>. Recovery plans have been prepared for only 744 of the 1686 listed
species. See id. Harvard biologist Edward 0. Wilson estimates that 27,000 species of
flora and fauna disappear each year at a rate of approximately 74 per day, or three per
hour. See Copley News Service, scenel, COPLEY NEWS SERV., Nov. 3, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
211. Environmentalists are "yelling for more money," which, they say, is necessary to
alleviate problems with the Act and for the successful implementation of the Act. Laura
Spitzberg, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 193, 233 (1994); see also Testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director of U.S.
FWS Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, M2 PRESSWMRE,
Sept. 26, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 14464191, at *10 [hereinafter
Testimony ofJamie Rappaport Clark] (asserting that lack of adequate funding will result
in "significant litigation backlogs"; moreover, actions by federal agencies will be delayed,
and the agencies will be unable to meet the burden of their increased responsibilities
under the Act). In response to Senator Thomas's (R-Wyo.) question regarding why
recovery plans have not been implemented for all listed species, Ms. Clark referred to a
lack of sufficient funds and resources. See Testimony ofJamie Rappaport Clark, supra, at
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Congress controls the appropriations for the ESA on an annual basis,
listing activities remain at risk.2 12  The overall consensus among
agencies involved in implementing the ESA, property rights
advocates, and environmentalists is that the ESA needs
reauthorization and reform. With Bennett creating a more level
playing field for property rights interests, reauthorization and reform
may proceed with both parties making greater efforts to
compromise.214
Both houses of Congress are currently considering ESA bills.215
On September 16, 1997, Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-Idaho), joined
by Senators John Chafee (R-Rhode Island), Max Baucus (D-
Montana), and Harry Reid (D-Nevada), introduced Senate Bill 1180
to reauthorize the ESA.216 The bill was sent to the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee by a vote of fifteen to
three and was placed on the Senate legislative agenda under general
*10.
212 See Richard Littell, The Endangered Species Act: Not Just for Environmentalists
Anymore, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 34, 36 (stating that since the ESA expired in
1992, the FWS has had to depend on "year-to-year grants of funds" and "cutbacks in the
agency's programs").
213. See Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings": A Call for
Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355 (1994) (suggesting reform
measures to continue effective environmental policy under the ESA); Bill Thompson,
Externalization of Federal Public Policy Costs: The Endangered Species Act, 8 FORDHAM
ENVrL. L.J. 171, 171-74 (1996) (asserting that ESA reform is a "good place to begin" to
find ways to meet the needs of our economy and environment); Michael Vivoli, Note,
"Harm"ing Individual Liberty: Assessing the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Babbitt v.
Sweet Home, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 275,329 (1996) (concluding that the ESA is flawed and
suggesting repeal).
214. One commentator has suggested that because the "strongest property rights
arguments" have been resolved by Bennett, "Congress can now get down to the business
of reauthorizing the [ESA] ... with a calm, rational deliberation, rather than by [the]
heated, rhetorically charged, partisan fighting" that characterized prior reform efforts.
Nix, supra note 190, at 780. But see Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant?
Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 547, 547 (1997)
(asserting that the Supreme Court has not had much impact on environmental
regulations).
215. Eight bills to reform the ESA were pending at the adjournment of the 104th
Congress. See Lynn L. Bergeson & Brenda L. Tollett, Environmental Legislative
Forecast What to Expect in 1997, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1997, at 25, available in
LEXIS, Legnew Library, Allnws File. Two of the most prominent bills were the Young-
Pombo House Bill, H.R. REP. 2275, 104th Cong. (1995), and the Kempthorne Senate Bill,
S. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995). For a discussion of the Young-Pombo and Kempthorne bills
and other major bills introduced in the 104th Congress, see Jeffrey S. Kopf, Slamming
Shut the Ark Doors: Congress's Attack on the Listing Process of the Endangered Species
Act, 3 ANIMAL L. 103, 118-21 (1997), and J.B. RuhI, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New"
Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal
Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107,1153-59 (1995).
216. See S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
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orders.217 The bipartisan bill appears to have the support of property
and development interests.218 The bill stresses species recovery over
maintenance of species on the brink of extinction, requiring the FWS
or the NMFS to develop recovery plans for all listed species within a
five-year period.219 The bill seeks to improve the quality of the ESA's
scientific findings by requiring "peer review" of listing and delisting
decisions by scientists nominated by the National Academy of
Sciences and appointed by the Secretary.20 The bill also stresses
greater public and state participation in managing listed species."
The bill provides incentives for landowners to protect a species'
habitat by issuing "low effect" permits,'m installing "no surprises"'
and "safe harbor" 4 policies, and creating a "candidate conservation
agreement" provision.' Finally, the bill authorizes a generous
increase in expected funding.226 The Senate is expected to take action
on the bill in 1998.27 Senators opposed to the bill are preparing to
introduce amendments to improve its species recovery provisions
when it is brought to the Senate floor."-
On July 31, 1997, Representative George Miller (D-California),
along with fifty-three other Democrat and Republican
representatives, introduced House of Representatives Bill 2351. 2
After introduction, the bill was referred to the Committee on
Resources and to the Committee on Ways and Means for a period to
be determined by the Speaker.230 Deemed "an environmentalists'
217. See id.
218. Environmentalists say Senate Bill 1180 would add new regulatory loopholes for
avoiding species protection. See Baker, supra note 196, at 733 (citing statement of John
Kostyak, counsel for the NWF). No environmental organization has endorsed the bill.
See NWF Endangered Species Update (last modified Feb. 3, 1998) <http://www.nwf.org/
endangered/you/digest10.html>.
219. See Baker, supra note 196, at 733.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5(c)(4) (1997); see supra note 181 and accompanying text.
223. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5(c)(5); see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
224. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5(f); see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
225. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5(d); see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
226. See Bipartisan ESA Reform, supra note 202. The bill proposes to double the
money for regulators and increase both the FWS and the NFMS budgets. See id. Fifty
million dollars would be appropriated for landowner incentives and forty million would be
made available for an interest-free loan fund. See id.
227. See Senate Species Rewrite Backers Plan for Quick Start, CONGRESS DAILY, Jan.
16, 1998, available in WESTLAW, 1998 WL 6604580, at *1 (predicting an early start for
action on the ESA reform bill).
228. See id.
229. H.R. 2351, 105th Cong. (1997).
230. See id.
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[sic] 'wish list,' "231 the House bill also seeks to promote species
recovery and create balanced incentives for engaging landowners in
species conservation, but without the Senate bill's proposed peer
review and with a more limited spectrum of incentives for
landowners? Supported primarily by environmentalists, the bill's
future is uncertain? 3
Common to both bills is the recognition that an accord must be
struck between environmentalists and property rights advocates if
there is to be species recovery.? t Ultimately, the success of any
reform effort depends on a proposed bill's ability to balance
economic and environmental interests. The Bennett decision
affirmed property owners' rights to be involved in ESA
determinations? 5 Similarly, Congress also should acknowledge such
interests in ESA reform.
Regardless of the Bennett decision's influence on ESA
reauthorization and reform, the decision is notable in that it has
cleared up the confusion among the circuit courts regarding the
application of the zone of interests test of prudential standing? 6
Prior to Bennett, the circuit courts were in significant discord
regarding both the applicability of the zone of interests test to actions
outside of the APA237 and whether or not economic concerns alone
would be adequate to bring a plaintiff within the zone of interests
protected by environmental statutes?.
The zone of interests test of prudential standing made its first
231. Elizabeth Megginson, chief counsel for the House Resources Committee, said
House Bill 2351 "reads like an environmentalists' [sic] 'wish list'" and stands no chance
of passing. House Efforts to Reach ESA Compromise Continue, CONGRESS DAILY, Jan.
16,1998, available in WESTLAW, 1998 WL 6604581, at *2.
232. See Baker, supra note 196, at 733.
233. For updates on the status of both the Senate and House ESA reform bills, see
Thomas Legislative Information on the Internet (updated daily) <http:llthomas.loc.gov/>.
234. See Baker, supra note 196, at 733.
235. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1169.
236. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (discussing further the disagreement
among the circuit courts).
237. See supra note 7 (citing and comparing the circuit court cases that address
whether the zone of interests test applies to civil suits under the ESA).
238. Compare Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that protection of economic interests is consistent with the statutory
purpose of the ESA), with Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 8
F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that "[t]he purpose of [the statute] is to protect
the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency
decisions"), and Dan Caputo v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 749 F.2d 571, 575
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing under the civil-suit provision
of the ESA because their claims arose out of economic, and not environmental, concerns).
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appearance in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp.39 In that case, the plaintiffs, who sold data processing
services to other companies, challenged a ruling of the Comptroller
of the Currency allowing banks to provide data processing services
directly to other banks and to bank customers. 40 The Supreme Court
held, pursuant to section 702 of the APA, that in addition to the case
or controversy requirement of Article III, a plaintiff seeking judicial
review under the APA must also show that his interests are "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'' The Court
analyzed the legislative history of the Banking Service Corporation
Act of 1962242 and, finding no congressional intent to preclude review
of the plaintiffs' action, recognized that the plaintiffs were within the
zone of interests protected by the statute.243
After the Association of Data Processing decision, the Court
began applying the zone of interests test as a prudential standing
limitation,' although its use was limited.245 Subsequently, in Clarke
v. Security Industry Ass'n,'-4 the Court revisited the zone of interests
test in another case involving an APA claim. In Clarke, the Supreme
Court broadened the requirements of the zone of interests test by
239. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
240. See id. at 151.
241. Id. at 153. Congress can use its legislative authority to grant standing to citizens
as long as the constitutional requirements of Article III are met. See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (holding that Congress can increase standing to the limits of
Article III). If Congress has not granted standing, the courts will apply the zone of
interests test. See Nichol, supra note 130, at 91. In determining the zone of interests,
courts look to the structure of the statute and its legislative history to reveal congressional
intent. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987). The interests
of a plaintiff that the statute protects may be "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational"
values, as well as economic values. Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
242. Pub. L. No. 87-856, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1864
(1994)).
243. See Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155-56. The Court pointed out
that Congress could eliminate prudential standing questions by authorizing standing up to
the limits of Article III. See id. at 156.
244. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,474-75 (1982).
245. The Court has rarely used the zone of interests test outside of the APA, although
it has been applied in constitutional cases and in private rights of action. See, e.g.,
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
zone of interests test applies to the Constitution generally); Air Courier Conference of
Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 530 (1991) (holding that the Postal
Reorganization Act does not give postal service workers a right to sue the United States
Postal Service for employing private couriers to deliver mail abroad).
246. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
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holding that judicial review will be denied only when "the plaintiff's
interests are ... marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute. 2 47 The Court asserted that the zone
of interests test was "not meant to be especially demanding." 24 The
Court in Clarke did not limit its inquiry to the specific provision of
the statute challenged by the plaintiffs, but decided that it could look
at any provision bearing on the overall purpose of the act.249 The
Court also stated that the zone of interests test was not universally
applicable to questions of prudential standing involving claims other
than those brought under the APA.250 The Court did not specify,
however, what tests would apply to plaintiffs seeking judicial review
under statutes other than the APA."
The Supreme Court later narrowed the interpretation of the
zone of interests test in Air Courier Conference of America v.
American Postal Workers UnionY2 Unlike the Clarke court, the
Court in Air Courier refused to accept that the overall purpose of the
act in question might support the plaintiffs' claims in deciding
whether their interest fell within the requisite zone of interests.32
The Court asserted that applying such a "level of generality ... could
deprive the zone-of-interests test of virtually all meaning." Thus,
according to the Court, to meet the zone of interests test, the
plaintiff's interest must be consistent with the provision of the act at
issue, not merely the overall purpose of the actP5
Prior to the Bennett decision, circuit courts did not agree on
whether the zone of interests test applied to actions brought pursuant
to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. 6 In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Hodel,2 7 the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff must meet only
Article III constitutional standing requirements to attain proper
247. Id. at 399.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 401.
250. See id. at 400 n.16.
251. See id. at 400.
252. 498 U.S. 517 (1991). In Air Courier, postal workers brought suit to challenge a
United States Postal Service decision that allowed private mail couriers to deliver mail
abroad under certain conditions. See id. at 519.
253. See id. at 529-30 (concluding that the overall policies of the Postal Reorganization
Act ("PRA") did not bring the plaintiffs' claims within the zone of interests of the PRA's
Private Express Statutes provisions).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 530.
256. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
257. 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub noin. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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standing under the ESA citizen-suit provision. s The court's position
was that the zone of interests test should not be applied because the
"any person" language in the ESA citizen-suit provision reflected the
intent of Congress to bypass the zone of interests test.29 Conversely,
the D.C. Circuit applied the zone of interests test in Idaho Public
Utilities Commission v. Interstate Commerce Commission,26 a suit
brought under the ESA citizen-suit provision. The D.C. Circuit cited
Clarke in emphasizing that the threshold question for the zone of
interests test is whether Congress intended to permit a particular
class of plaintiffs to challenge agency violations of the statute in
question 61 Because the state of Idaho, as plaintiff, asserted an
interest in wildlife protection, the Court concluded that Idaho was
within the zone of interests protected by the ESA 6z
Similarly, in Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v.
Brown,263 the Ninth Circuit applied the zone of interests test brought
under the ESA's civil-suit provision by hydropower producers and
consumers of endangered salmon36  The court noted that it was still
an "open question" whether the zone of interests test should be
258. See id. at 1038 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979)). The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in Defenders of Wildlife because
the plaintiffs failed to meet the constitutional standing requirements of injury-in-fact and
redressability, but the Court never addressed the circuit court's conclusion that the
citizen-suit provision of the ESA removed prudential standing limitations. See Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-71. More recently, the Eighth Circuit did not apply the zone
of interests test to an ESA citizen suit in Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997),
a case that arose when snowmobilers challenged the National Park Service's closure of
areas in Voyageurs National Park because of the presence of endangered species. See
Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 125 F.3d
661 (8th Cir. 1997). At the district court level, the court applied the zone of interests test
to plaintiffs' claims brought under the APA, but not to a claim filed under the ESA civil-
suit provision. See id. at 1341-42. The Park Service and intervening conservation groups
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, but the circuit court did not address the district court's
conclusion regarding the snowmobilers' standing under the ESA. See Mausolf, 125 F.3d
at 667.
259. See Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F.2d at 1039 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(g),
1532(13)).
260. 35 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Idaho v. Public Utilities Commission, the state of
Idaho and three mining companies filed suit against the Interstate Commerce
Commission for failure to prepare a biological assessment within the 180-day limit
mandated by the ESA. See id. at 597.
261. See id. at 590-91. The D.C. Circuit has also applied the zone of interests test to
claims brought under other environmental statutes. See Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921-27 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying the zone of interests
test applied in the citizen-suit context to limit actions to those who are directly regulated
or benefited by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
262. See Idaho v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 592.
263. 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
264. See id. at 1065.
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applied to parties asserting solely economic harm,2 65 but a
determination on such grounds was unnecessary because the
plaintiffs also asserted an interest in the preservation of the salmon in
question, and thus their environmental interests alone met the
standing requirement.266 However, prior to Supreme Court review,
the Ninth Circuit subsequently resolved the "open question" in
Bennett v. Plenert,267 in which it held that the zone of interests test
applied to citizen suits brought under the ESA and that petitioners
asserting solely economic interests were barred from filing suit for
failure to satisfy the test.2 s
Circuit courts applying the zone of interests test of prudential
standing to suits brought under the ESA's citizen-suit provision still
had to determine whether each plaintiff's particular harm fell within
the zone of interests protected by the statute.269 For example, even
though the D.C. Circuit applied the zone of interests test in Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Glickman,2 70 the court concluded that the
plaintiffs' economic interests alone were sufficient to satisfy the zone
of interests test of prudential standing for suits brought pursuant to
the ESA citizen-suit provision z1  In that case, non-profit
corporations, municipalities, and logging companies sued to
challenge the government's choice of alternatives for the method of
265. See id. (noting that the Eighth Circuit had decided to dispense with the zone of
interests requirement for citizen suits under the ESA).
266. See id. at 1065.
267. 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154
(1997).
268. See id. at 918-19. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit decision in Bennett v.
Plenert, see supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has also
determined that non-environmental concerns do not satisfy the prudential standing
requirements for other environmental statutes. In Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United
States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit applied the zone of
interests test to a citizen suit under NEPA and decided that the plaintiffs' solely economic
interists were not within the zone of interests Congress intended to protect by statute.
See iL at 716. Similarly, in Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation District,
749 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit denied plaintiffs' standing under the Clean
Water Act's citizen-suit provision, see Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994)), because the plaintiffs' injury did not
arise out of an environmental interest. See Dan Caputo Co., 749 F.2d at 575.
269. Even though some circuit courts applied the zone of interests test, at least one
commentator notes that they sometimes applied it incorrectly. See Kathleen C. Becker,
Bennett v. Plenert. Environmental Citizen Suits and the Zone of Interest Test, 26 ENVTL.
L. 1071, 1081-85 (1996) (addressing misapplication of the zone of interests prudential
standing test in circuit courts). The author suggests that the language "'any person' [in
the ESA citizen-suit provision] does not grant all conceivable persons a cause of action"
and asserts that such an interpretation is supported by policy reasons. Id. at 1088.
270. 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
271. See id. at 1237.
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timber harvesting in a national forest.272 The court determined that
Congress had intended to subject agencies to both environmental and
economic challenges, and granted standing to the plaintiffs 7
3
The issue of whether prudential standing applied to actions
brought pursuant to the citizen-suit provision of the ESA was nearly
resolved in 1995 in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon.274 Landowners, logging companies, and families
dependent on the forest product industries brought the case against
the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the FWS under the
citizen-suit provision of the ESA.2 75 Plaintiffs alleged that the
application of the "harm" regulation276 to the red-cockaded
woodpecker and northern spotted owl had injured the plaintiffs
economically.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the
question of the plaintiffs' standing was not raised despite the
plaintiffs' assertion of solely economic interests in challenging the
Secretary's regulation regarding habitat modification. 8 Because the
issue of standing was not raised, the Supreme Court deferred
answering the question regarding the applicability of the zone of
interests test to citizen suits under the ESA until the Bennett
decision.279
Bennett clears up the confusion among the circuit courts
regarding the applicability of the zone of interests test to suits
brought under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. The Bennett Court
held that "any person" may bring suit, expanding standing to the
limits of Article III and displacing prudential standing requirements
272. See id. at 1231. The plaintiffs' first claim asserted an interest in observing grizzly
bears in the wild. See id. at 1236. The court dismissed this claim, stating that the plaintiffs
did not have a real interest in such protection. See id. at 1236-37.
273. See id. at 1236-38. Also at issue in Mountain States Legal Foundation was the
question of whether the plaintiffs' interests fell within the zone of interests protected by
NEPA to grant them standing under their NEPA claim. See id. at 1235-36; see also infra
notes 292-302 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural requirements imposed by
NEPA on federal agencies). For a more comprehensive analysis of the Mountain States
Legal Foundation opinion, see generally Robert I. Levy, Note, Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Glickman: Environmental Standing Continues Its Trek As a Moving Target,
10 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 123 (1997), and Elizabeth Monohan & Brian Wright, Comment,
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman: Disputes over Timber Removal from
National Forests, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189 (1996-97).
274. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
275. See id. at 692.
276. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretary's
definition of the term "harm").
277. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 692.
278. See id.
279. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163.
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for claims brought under the citizen-suit provision.8 ° Plaintiffs
bringing claims pursuant to the APA, however, must still meet the
prudential standing zone of interests requirements2' Whether a
plaintiff's claim lies within the zone of interests is determined by
reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff
relies, not the overall purpose of the act, a determination the Court
believed had been established by precedent.' 2 The petitioners in
Bennett brought claims pursuant to section 7 of the ESA, 283 which
required the Secretary to use economic considerations in making
critical habitat designations. 4 Because Congress contemplated that
the Secretary would consider economic factors, the Court determined
that the petitioners' economic interests were among those protected
by the provision of the statute on which the petitioners relied and,
therefore, the petitioner's met the zone of interests test necessary to
pursue their claim.285
The inclusion of economic interests within the zone of interests
for claims brought under the APA may have implications for other
cases brought pursuant to environmental statutes. Provided that
economic interests are contemplated within the statutory provision
on which a plaintiff relies, it is likely that economic interests will now
be found within the zone of interests protected by other
environmental statutes. Cases like Dan Caputo Co. v. Russian River
County Sanitation Distric2 s6 and Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United
States Forest Service,' denying standing to plaintiffs with completely
economic interests, appear to have been decided wrongly in light of
Bennett.2s8
280. See id. at 1167.
281. See id.; see also supra note 20 (discussing a plaintiff's right to judicial review
under the APA).
282. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167 (citing Air Courier Conference of Am. v.
American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970)). Justice Scalia, writing the opinion of the Court, expressed frustration at the
Ninth Circuit's denial of standing, stating that it was "difficult to understand how the
Ninth Circuit could have failed to see ... from our cases" that the plaintiff's economic
interests should be consistent with the particular provision of the ESA at issue. Id.
283. See id. at 1168.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. 749 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1984); see also supra note 268 (discussing Dan Caputo Co.).
287. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra note 268 (discussing Nevada Land
Action Ass'n).
288. Other environmental statutes using the "any person" language, like the NEPA
and the Clean Water Act, will most likely be found to negate the zone of interests
requirement. Absent such language, the zone of interests test may still apply; however,
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While the Supreme Court did not address the issue directly, the
Bennett decision could affect standing determinations for parties with
development interests desiring to bring a claim against the Secretary
making an ESA determination. 289 Controversy exists among the
circuit courts as to whether the Secretary of the Interior or the
Secretary of Commerce should be exempt from complying with
NEPA when taking action under the ESA and declaring critical
habitat for species listed as endangered or threatened.290 Using
NEPA to delay government action is a tactic generally favored by
environmentalists2 91 but this tactic becomes problematic when it
threatens environmental interests.
NEPA contains procedural requirements that federal agencies
must follow to assess the consequences of certain actions. 2 2 When an
agency proposes an action that may have consequences for the
environment, the agency first must conduct an environmental
assessment.293  The environmental assessment is a preliminary
analysis of the agency's action and the effects it will have on the
physical and economic environment.294  The environmental
assessment concludes with a finding of no significant impact or with a
determination that the effects will be significant on the
environment.295 If the effects of the action are predicted to be
significant, the federal agency must prepare an environmental impact
statement ("EIS"). 296 To fulfill the EIS requirement, the agency must
prepare a finding of all possible effects of a proposed action,297 list all
reasonable alternatives to the action,298 and solicit comments from
r the ESA and APA).
. The petitioners in Bennett raised a fourth claim: that the designation of critical
at violated NEPA because it was not preceded by an environmental assessment. See
ett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160 n.1. The court of appeals' dismissal of this claim was not
raged on appeal and the Supreme Court did not address the issue. See id
). See Patterson, supra note 149, at 754.
L. See Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental
e, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 565, 578 (1997) (asserting that NEPA may be used to
ice environmental justice by facilitating a delay in government action).
1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4332 (1994).
3. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.1 (1997).
1. See id. § 1508.9. -V
5. See id. § 1501.4.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
7. See id. § 4332(C)(ii). The EIS must assess both direct and indirect effects. See 40
Z. § 1508.8.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b).
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federal and state agencies and other interested parties.299  Not
surprisingly, the NEPA process is often the source of endless delays
in agency actions and is sometimes the cause of a project's complete
injunction.31 If the NEPA process were made applicable to ESA
actions, this "could create a situation in which anyone could use
NEPA as an obstructionist tactic to impede the protection of an
endangered species."301 Allowing NEPA challenges to ESA actions
might create situations in which the time required to comply with the
NEPA mandates or to defend a NEPA challenge would result in the
loss of an endangered species or a species' critical habitat.3°2
Despite the possibility of abuse, at least one circuit court has
determined that NEPA does apply to ESA actions.3°3 In Catron
County Board of Commissioners v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Service,31 the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary of the Interior
must comply with NEPA guidelines when making critical habitat
designations.3 5 The court rejected the Secretary's argument that the
similarities in procedure between NEPA and the ESA,311 along with
congressional silence as to judicial and executive noncompliance with
the NEPA mandates, was evidence that the ESA displaced NEPA.30 7
The Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the assertion that no impact to
the physical environment would occur from a designation of critical
habitat.308 The court concluded that when the environmental effects
of an action are unknown, Congress intended that an environmental
assessment be prepared in accordance with NEPA guidelines.30 9
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
300. See Patterson, supra note 149, at 757-58.
301. Id. at 784.
302. See id.
303. See Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429,1432 (10th Cir. 1996).
304. 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 1436.
306. See id. The Secretary claimed that the ESA requirements were duplicative of the
NEPA requirements. See id. A federal agency may be excused from NEPA
requirements if (1) "by complying [with NEPA] the agency would ... violate its own
enabling statute," or (2) if the action the agency is planning requires the agency to make
assessments that are "functionally equivalent" to NEPA's requirements. Richard W.
Bertelson, III, Note, Danger for the Endangered Species Act?: Catron County Board of
Commissioners, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 12 J. NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L. 167, 176, 178 (1996-97) (addressing the functional equivalence
doctrine).
307. See Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1436.
308. See id. at 1436-39.
309. See id. at 1439.
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Douglas County v. Babbitt310 that NEPA did not apply to
designations of critical habitat for the northern spotted owl.31 ' The
Ninth Circuit determined that the ESA's primary purpose of
preventing species extinction superseded the NEPA mandate of a
comprehensive analysis of a designation's effects on the human
environment.312 The court interpreted the legislative intent narrowly
in determining that the congressional requirement to consider
economic and other relevant impacts was restricted to actions that
change the physical environment.313 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that applying NEPA to the ESA would not further the
purposes of either statute.1 4
The conflict between the circuit courts regarding the
applicability of NEPA to the ESA was not directly resolved in
Bennett. Perhaps the Supreme Court's decision not to address the
Ninth Circuit's dismissal of the petitioners' NEPA claim exemplifies
its agreement with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Douglas County that
the ESA is not subject to NEPA mandates. It has been suggested
that because the Supreme Court, through Bennett, "has ... allowed
challenges to federal actions taken pursuant to the ESA based solely
on economic injury, no need exists to use NEPA for [such a]
purpose." '315 If the Court were to determine that NEPA is intended
to apply to the ESA, this determination could significantly affect the
strength of the ESA through substantial delays in agency action and
additional challenges to agency determinations. 16 However, the
Court may be unwilling to pull all of the teeth from the ESA, one of
the few environmental statutes that is considered to have any bite.3"
310. 48 F3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
311. See id. at 1507.
312. See id. at 1503.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 1506. For further discussion on the Douglas County decision, see
generally Melaney Payne, Note, Critically Acclaimed but Not Critically Followed-The
Inapplicability of the National Environmental Policy Act to Federal Agency Actions:
Douglas County v. Babbitt, 7 VILL. ENvTL. LJ. 339 (1996).
315. Patterson, supra note 149, at 790.
316. See Johnson, supra note 291, at 579 (stating that NEPA is time-consuming and
that citizens can force further delays through litigation if the government does not comply
fully with NEPA's mandates).
317. Unlike some other environmental statutes, the ESA contains stringent
enforcement provisions, including civil and criminal penalties. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(2)(b)
(1994); Jean M. Emery, Environmental Impact Statements and Critical Habitat: Does
NEPA Apply to the Designation of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act?, 28
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 973, 975 (1996); Kevin D. Batt, Comment, Above All, Do No Harm: Sweet
Home and Section Nine of the Endangered Species Act, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1191 n.67
(1995) (asserting that it is the civil and criminal penalties of section 11 that give the Act
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Given the detrimental effect that NEPA challenges could
present, it seems unlikely that the Court would allow them,
particularly now that plaintiffs can bring facial challenges to the ESA
when they believe the Secretary has failed to consider the importance
of economic interests. Despite the potential delays NEPA could
create in ESA determinations, NEPA supporters believe broad
application of the NEPA procedural requirements will preserve the
ESA's integrity for balancing economics against the environment.318
Mechanisms like the ESA emergency listing provision 319 and NEPA's
"functional equivalence" doctrine may reduce the negative effects on
the species involved.3 0 While the intense scrutiny that the NEPA
procedures require may be valuable in improving the scientific basis
of a federal agency's decision, ultimately the Bennett decision has
made NEPA unnecessary by providing adequate incentive for
agencies to use diligence in making listing and critical habitat
decisions.32'
Armed with the Bennett decision, parties with property interests
are asserting their newly recognized right to challenge agency
determinations under the ESA,322 and it is likely that more challenges
will follow.3 3 This increased litigation may create even greater
financial demands on already underfunded agencies,32 4 further
"its bite"); see also supra note 70 (explaining civil and criminal penalties under the ESA).
318. See Jim Davis, Note, Environmental Law-Can NEPA and the ESA Work
Together? Designations of Critical Habitat for an Endangered Species Must Fulfill
National Environmental Policy Act Requirements, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 677, 691-
93 (1997).
319. One commentator suggests that the ESA's emergency regulations will alleviate
the risk of potential extinction of species and permanent loss of habitat for species
awaiting critical habitat designations. See id. at 696-97.
320. See Payne, supra note 314, at 373.
321. See Cain, supra note 135, at 15 (recognizing that while the Bennett decision might
increase the time and effort the FWS puts into a section 7 determination, it is nevertheless
desirable because it ensures valid data).
322. See Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (concluding that landowners meet the standing requirement in an action
challenging FWS's listing of the fairy shrimp as endangered); Wyoming Farm Bureau
Fed'n v. Babbitt, Nos. 94-CV-286-D, 95-CV-027-D, 95-CV-1015-D, 1997 WL 781027, at
*5 (D. Wyo. Dec. 12, 1997) (granting standing to Farm Bureau members asserting an
economic interest in ranching in an action under the ESA challenging the re-introduction
of gray wolves in Yellowstone National Park).
323. Ten amicus briefs were filed in Bennett on behalf of developmental organizations
and other property interests. See supra note 184. Vermont Law School's Environmental
Law Center Director, Patrick Parenteau, believes the Bennett decision will lead to "'a
surge of litigation under the [ESA].'" See Littell, supra note 212, at 34 (quoting Patrick
Parenteau).
324. See Testimony of Jamie Rappaport Clark, supra note 211, at *10 (addressing the
lack of sufficient agency funding). Providing compensation for landowners who are
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decreasing their ability to conduct listing determinations, establish
critical habitats, and prepare recovery plans.3 z  The ESA
reauthorization movement should address the potential strain on
agency financial resources if the ESA is to continue to function
properly.
Despite the current consensus that ESA reform should include
greater consideration of parties with property interests, reform
provisions should not compromise the preservation of our
endangered species. Although many species may appear
unimportant or unattractive, we cannot lose sight of the larger
picture. Ultimately, all species, including the human species, are
interconnected and reliant on one another for a healthful existence. 6
To remove even a seemingly insignificant number of minute
organisms from an ecosystem is to disrupt a delicate balance with
repercussions on a larger scale.327
The potential benefits of even microscopic species also should
not be overlooked.3 In enacting the ESA, Congress appreciated
required to surrender their property because of the presence of an endangered species is
often very expensive. For example, the federal government paid $250 million dollars to a
Texas man and $130 million to the state of California in order to save from logging and
development 7000 acres of prime redwoods, the home of the Marbled Murrelet bird. See
Michael Satchell, To Save the Sequoias: A Dollars for Trees Deal Ends a Fight in an
Ancient Forest, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 1996, at 42,42.
325. In addition to the significant time factor associated with making listing and
critical habitat determinations, the analysis can be expensive. See Cain, supra note 135, at
15-16. With heightened scrutiny applied to their decisions, the agencies responsible for
implementing the ESA may be hesitant to make decisions that are not economically
beneficial to the parties involved. See id.
326. See Jeffrey A. Lockwood, The Intent and Implementation of the ESA: A Matter of
Scale, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 551, 556-58 (1997) (discussing the interdependency of
all species in an ecosystem). One commentator noted that Congress's ill approach toward
an environmental issue also might adversely affect the health of all species, including
humans. See Dick Thompson, Congressional Chain-Saw Massacre, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at
58,58.
327. In determining the fate of the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, Judge Wald gave
credence to the interconnectedness of nature, using biologist Edward Wilson's words:
"Every species is part of an ecosystem, an expert specialist of its kind, tested
relentlessly as it spreads its influence through the food web. To remove it is to
entrain changes in other species, raising the populations of some, reducing or
even extinguishing others, risking a downward spiral of the larger assemblage."
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053 (1997) (quoting
EDWARD WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 308 (1992)).
328. While human science has been able to fully explore the largest of the Earth's
species, there are perhaps thousands of microscopic species that have not yet been
studied. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, NATURALIST 364 (1994) (asserting that
"[m]icrowildernesses exist in a handful of soil" and that "[tien million bacteria live in a
gram of ordinary soil," which "represent thousands of species, almost none of which are
known to science").
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what miracle cures the Earth's creatures might hold, stating that the
"value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable." 32 9
While all creatures may not hold intrinsic value,330 the fact that
organisms may contain medicinal value necessitates careful
deliberation before decisions are made that could deprive mankind,
as well as the creature in question, of a fighting chance of survival.331
In addition to medicinal value, learning more about endangered
species can help to develop new agricultural products and lead to the
discovery of cleaner, renewable sources of energy.332 While no one
knows for certain the future of the ESA, in the wake of Bennett, it
appears that property owners will play an integral role. But the
presence of property owners at the endangered species roundtable
does not have to be a threatening event for environmentalists. The
329. H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4 (1973).
330. Some species have been found to have medical uses; for example, the Pacific Yew
tree contains a substance called taxol that may cure cancer, but the vast majority of
species do not. See Plater, supra note 191, at 852-53. However, Senator Chafee (R-RI),
sponsor of the most recent Senate ESA Reauthorization bill, Senate Bill 1180, noted that
when Noah filled his ark, God told him to include all species, " 'clean and unclean, of
birds and everything that crawls on the ground'" and did not limit the passengers to "only
the most beautiful animals or those plants that might have some particular use to
mankind and perhaps to help him cure cancer." 142 CONG. REC. 1842 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1996) (statement of Sen. Chafee (quoting Genesis 7:8)). Recently, otherwise conservative
Evangelical Christians have begun a movement to support a stronger ESA. See Peter
Steinfels, Evangelical Group Defends Laws Protecting Endangered Species As a Modern
"Noah's Ark," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at A12. The Evangelical Christian supporters
asserted in 1996, when urging Congress not to weaken the ESA, that "[o]nly the Creator
has the right to destroy His creation." Eugene Linden, What Have We Wrought? Our
Descendants in the Next Century May Find Themselves Paying Dearly for the Material
Magic of the Consumer Society, TIME INT'L, Nov. 1, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997
WL 13376245, at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
331. Justice Douglas, in his famous dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), recognized the importance of all organisms and the limitations courts face in
making decisions regarding endangered species:
"A teaspoon of living earth contains 5 million bacteria, 20 million fungi,
one million protozoa, and 200,000 algae. No living human can predict what vital
miracles may be locked in this dab of life, this stupendous reservoir of genetic
materials that have evolved continuously since the dawn of the earth."
See id. at 750-51 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting an environmental publication).
Justice Douglas noted that penicillin, tetracycline, and other antibiotics were created from
"'lowly molds'" and now rank among the" 'most powerful and effective medicines ever
discovered by man.'" Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting an environmental
publication). He continued by stating, "'Medical scientists still wince at the thought that
we might have inadvertently wiped out the rhesus monkey, medically, the most important
research animal on earth.'" Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting an environmental
publication).
332. See Kelly A. Keenan, Note, They Paved Paradise and Put up a Parking Lot:




ESA process actually may function better if property owners
understand its components and become stakeholders with a vested
interest in the process.3 The time is ripe to realize that without the
enlistment of property owners, the Act itself may become extinct.
DEANNE M. BARNEY
333. See Institute for Environment & Natural Resources Board Principles, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 623, 623 (1997) (suggesting that the ESA will work better if landowners
are involved and that they may be able to propose solutions to improve ESA
implementation and generate greater public support).
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